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They Will Survive—Again: CLO Resilience Amid the
COVID-19 Pandemic
I. INTRODUCTION
Collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) have garnered a lot of
attention in recent years, from popular news outlets, 1 politicians,2 and
market observers alike.3 However, this admission is where the consensus
ends, as the strengths and shortcomings of CLOs have been fiercely
debated in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. 4 Despite
emerging from the last financial crisis largely unscathed,5 the asset class
has not been permitted to ride the coattails of its successes into the present

1. See Matt Phillips, Wall Street Loves These Risky Loans. The Rest of Us Should Be Wary.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/business/economy/clocorporate-loans.html [https://perma.cc/7CZM-CJRK] (covering CLOs because they have
become one of the “hottest investments on Wall Street”).
2. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the
Treasury, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Joseph Otting, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Jerome Powell,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.11.14%20Letter%20to%20Regulators
%20on%20Leveraged%20Lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CZM-CJRK] [hereinafter Warren
Letter] (making specific reference to CLOs in a letter condemning the state of the leveraged
loan market).
3. See Stephen Brown & Abraham Salander, Amid COVID Market Volatility, Are CLOs
the
Next
RMBS?,
LAW360
(Apr.
20,
2020,
6:52
PM),
https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/19853/original/brown%20salander%20Law36
0%20April%2020%202020.pdf?1587500081 [https://perma.cc/6X9L-BB9Y] (“For the past
several years, market observers have warned of risks associated with collateralized loan
obligations, or CLOs.”).
4. See Telis Demos, What We Talk About When We Talk About CLOs, WALL ST. J. (June
10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-aboutclos-11591786801 [https://perma.cc/8T3Q-MBJ3] (“There were many debates about the risks
of CLOs during the debt-market boom of the past few years.”).
5. See YAN CAO ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS IN
THE
AGE
OF
COVID-19,
at
1
(2020),
Westlaw,
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/Collateralized-Loan-Obligations-in-theAge-of-COVID-19/Collateralized-Loan-Obligations-in-the-Age-of-COVID-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TR8L-ZJE8] (noting that CLOs escaped the 2008 financial crisis “relatively
unscathed”).
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day and avoid scrutiny.6 Instead, CLOs have been the object of mounting
criticism—a reality that is, at least in part, traceable to the meteoric
growth of the CLO market.7
Today, the CLO market in the United States is valued at just
under $700 billion, more than double its size in 2008. 8 Although this
figure only amounts to roughly one-tenth of the American mortgage
market before the 2008 crisis,9 it has not stopped critics of the CLO
market from comparing CLOs to the infamous collateralized debt
obligations that precipitated the last financial collapse.10 Moreover,
critics point to recent trends in the CLO market, namely the securitization
of large amounts of poor-quality corporate debt, to suggest that CLOs
could pose a risk to the stability of the financial system. 11
Prior to 2020, concerns about the risks building in the CLO
market were well documented. 12 Nevertheless, even those who pointed
6. See FIN. STABILITY BD., VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH LEVERAGED LOANS AND
COLLATERALIZED
LOAN OBLIGATIONS
1
(2019),
https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P191219.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVM5-63H6] (acknowledging that the
growth of the leveraged loan and CLO markets has led to greater scrutiny).
7. See Cezary Podkul & Paul J. Davies, Financial Engineering Made Risky Loans Seem
Safe. Now They Face a Huge Test., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/financial-engineering-made-risky-loans-seem-safe-now-theyface-a-huge-test-11584702000 [https://perma.cc/QLE8-Z5UM] (suggesting that the growth
of the CLO and leveraged loan markets “led global regulators to warn of potential instabilities
building in the financial system”).
8. See S.P. KOTHARI ET AL., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, U.S. CREDIT MARKETS
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 ECONOMIC SHOCK 47 (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Credit-Markets_COVID-19_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F783-AXTF] (noting that the CLO market is valued at $642 billion and
providing a graph that tracks the size of the CLO market from 2005 to 2019).
9. Phillips, supra note 1.
10. See George Oldfield & John Anthony, Collateralized Loan Obligations: Subprime
Déjà
Vu?,
LAW360
(Jan.
28,
2019,
12:29
PM),
https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/15427_collateralized_loan_obligations_subpr
ime_dj_vu.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF9E-TD7Z] (“[A]larm bells are ringing for some market
observers, and some investors, who cite parallels to the subprime mortgage market in the
2004-2008 era.”).
11. See id. (citing concerns about the “record volume of low credit quality loans being
securitized” in CLOs).
12. See Joe Rennison, CLOs: The Specialist Loan Vehicles Luring Yield-Hungry Investors,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/db97c650-1ec6-11e9-b12646fc3ad87c65 [https://perma.cc/G82K-UAMM] (describing concerns about developments in
the CLO market); Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (discussing the “increased riskiness” of
CLOs); Those $700B in US CLOs: Who Holds Them, What Risk They Pose, S&P GLOBAL
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to weaknesses in the CLO market acknowledged that the overall strength
of the economy might serve to temper concerns and suggested that it
would likely take an economic downturn to reveal how problems
mounting in the CLO market could damage the economy more broadly.13
With this in mind, 2020 should have been the year that proved
disastrous for CLOs, effectively bringing critics’ warnings home to
roost.14 When the COVID-19 pandemic15 prompted a nationwide
lockdown that rattled the economy, it appeared as though the period of
economic stability keeping problems within the CLO market at bay
would finally end, leading to damaging losses at best, and a 2008-like
banking collapse at worst.16
While many of the long-term effects of the 2020 downturn will
continue to materialize in the years ahead, CLOs so far have weathered
the storm.17 This is not to say that the CLO market did not experience
volatility or that it escaped the downturn wholly unscathed: ratings
agencies downgraded CLOs, and the leveraged loans that they hold, on a

MKT.
INTEL.
(June
21,
2019,
11:54
AM),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/leveraged-loan-news/those-700b-in-us-clos-who-holds-them-what-risk-they-pose
[https://perma.cc/3UTZ-EA79] [hereinafter CLOs: Who Holds Them] (“The flourishing
market for collateralized loan obligations has come under increasing scrutiny of late by U.S.
lawmakers and regulatory agencies . . . .”); Craig Torres & Lisa Lee, Wider Risk of Leveraged
Loans Warrants Scrutiny, Tarullo Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 30, 2018, 9:39 AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X43T97DS000000?bna_news_filter=bankinglaw&jcsearch=BNA%252000000166c529d347ad77c7fd2e650000#jcite
[https://perma.cc/99XH-CW86] (highlighting concerns about the leveraged loans that are
packaged into CLOs).
13. See Phillips, supra note 1 (suggesting that risks in the CLO market are kept at bay when
the economy is strong).
14. See Frank Partnoy, The Looming Bank Collapse, THE ATLANTIC (Jul.–Aug. 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/coronavirus-banks-collapse/612247/
[https://perma.cc/8NC9-QY94] (suggesting that volatility in the CLO market could be
detrimental to the market as a whole).
15. See generally Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/healthtopics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/GW2U-R68Y] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021)
(providing an overview of COVID-19).
16. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (presenting a worst-case scenario in which a distressed CLO
market could precipitate a collapse of the banking system).
17. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8 (suggesting that while the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic and the economic downturn will continue to materialize in the years ahead, CLOs
have so far “weathered the storm”).
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massive scale.18 These widespread rating downgrades caused the price
of CLO debt to fall, and new CLO issuance slowed considerably. 19
Despite this, the CLO market rebounded well from the downturn that
gripped the economy in the earliest months of 2020.20
The experience of CLOs in 2020 seems to suggest that certain
weaknesses in the CLO market, while substantiated, might not on their
own be capable of destabilizing CLOs in ways that prove disastrous for
the economy as a whole.21 This Note explores why volatility among
CLOs did not damage or upend the market as some critics feared, and it
will end by considering what CLO performance during 2020 could mean
for the future of the CLO market.22
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II provides the necessary
background on CLOs by describing what they are and by examining the
kinds of entities that hold CLO securities.23 Part III details specific
criticisms of the CLO market.24 Part IV considers the impact of the 2020
downturn by exploring why it should have wreaked havoc on CLOs, but
18. See id. (providing an overview of the ways in which COVID-19 and the economic
downturn negatively impacted the CLO market).
19. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Issuance Rises Slightly in Second Quarter amid Loan
Downgrades, REUTERS (July 13, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clo20201half/clo-issuance-rises-slightly-in-second-quarter-amid-loan-downgradesidUSKCN24E20O [https://perma.cc/5K9K-3YPT] (reporting that the COVID-19 pandemic
led to volatility and low levels of issuance in the CLO market).
20. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8 (noting that, in light of the 2020 downturn, the CLO
market has “fared reasonably well”).
21. See Hannah Lang, Virus Could Deal Blow to Leveraged Loans. What’s That Mean for
Banks?,
AM .
BANKER
(Mar.
11,
2020,
2:26
PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/virus-could-deal-blow-to-leveraged-loans-whatsthat-mean-for-banks [https://perma.cc/Z72S-YJXM] (acknowledging weaknesses in the CLO
market, but suggesting that the economic impact of COVID-19 is not likely to be “a
cataclysmic event” for mounting corporate debt).
22. See Lisa Lee & Sarah Husband, CLOs Fight Back Against Hedge Fund Efforts to
Siphon
Value,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
25,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-25/clos-fight-back-against-hedge-fundefforts-to-siphon-value [https://perma.cc/W526-UFBA] (describing potential changes in the
CLO market that could arise in response to the 2020 downturn); See also Kristen Haunss,
CLOs Seek to Tie Assets to Loan Index after Missing out on Covid Selloff, REUTERS (June 26,
2020, 8:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/clo-loanindex/clos-seek-to-tie-assets-toloan-index-after-missing-out-on-covid-selloff-idUKL1N2E301N [https://perma.cc/VNX6TG2D] (presenting one way the CLO market may evolve in response to the 2020 economic
downturn).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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ultimately did not, and the reasons behind this outcome. 25 Part V
examines the lasting impact of the 2020 downturn on the CLO market
and offers a prediction as to its future.26 Finally, Part VI provides a brief
conclusion.27
II. BACKGROUND
A.

An Introduction to CLOs

A CLO is a structured credit product that, at its most basic level,
assembles a pool of loans against which a series of debt obligations are
issued.28 With limited exceptions, the loans pooled to serve as collateral
for CLO debt are leveraged loans: loans made to corporate borrowers
with below investment grade ratings. 29 Roughly 90% of a CLO’s
portfolio is comprised of these loans, which typically receive a single-B
rating and are secured by a first-lien claim on assets of the corporate
borrower.30
The process of structuring a CLO begins with the CLO Manager,
a public or private asset manager employed by the CLO, who assembles
the loan portfolio and makes investment decisions on its behalf.31 Before
the CLO can issue securities to investors, the CLO Manager must do two

25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. SETH KATZENSTEIN ET AL., ICG CAPITAL MKT. STRATEGIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO

COLLATERALIZED
LOAN
OBLIGATIONS
(CLOS)
1
(2020),
https://www.icgam.com/~/media/Files/I/ICGAM-V2/documents/20200603-clo-primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P48Y-PXZK].
29. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (defining leveraged loans as below investment
grade loans made to highly leveraged companies).
30. See JENNIFER JOHNSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POLICY
AND RESEARCH, COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS (CLOS) PRIMER 3 (2018),
https://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/primer_180821.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTP29796] (“For ‘traditional’ CLOs, the collateral pool primarily consists of below investment
grade, first lien, senior secured broadly syndicated bank loans (usually at least 90% of the
portfolio) . . . .”).
31.See CAO ET AL., supra note 5 (describing how CLO Managers are responsible for
selecting collateral and for actively managing the CLO portfolio).
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things.32 First, the CLO Manager will set up a bankruptcy remote, special
purpose vehicle to hold leveraged loans and issue debt and equity
securities to CLO investors.33 Second, the CLO Manager must assemble
an initial pool of loans that can be used to market the CLO to potential
investors.34 To accomplish this, the CLO Manager will often rely on an
arranger—usually a large bank—to provide a loan (a “Warehouse
Facility”) that the CLO Manager uses to purchase the leveraged loans that
underly the CLO portfolio.35 Once a group of investors interested in
purchasing CLO securities is assembled, the special purpose entity issues
CLO debt obligations and equity securities.36 The Warehouse Facility is
paid down with proceeds from the debt and equity issuance, and any
remaining funds are used to purchase additional loans for the CLO
portfolio.37
For a period of two to five years after the CLO’s inception, the
CLO Manager has discretionary authority to purchase and sell loans with
the view of improving the overall credit quality of the portfolio.38 When
a loan held by the CLO is downgraded by the ratings agencies or trades
at a price below par in the secondary market, the CLO Manager may opt
to sell this loan and use the proceeds to purchase a loan with better
repayment prospects. 39 Alternatively, the CLO Manager may use the
reinvestment period to take advantage of volatility in the leveraged loan

32. See, e.g., Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining how the CLO Manager
establishes a special purpose entity and relies on a warehouse loan to purchase loans for the
CLO portfolio).
33. See id. (describing the process by which the CLO Manager establishes a special purpose
entity).
34. See id. (explaining how the special purpose entity purchases loans for the CLO portfolio
and then issues debt securities to investors).
35. See id. (noting that large banks provide warehouse facilities for the purpose of
accumulating loans for a new CLO).
36. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 3 (“CLOs are asset-backed securities issued
by a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV acquires a portfolio of leveraged loans[,] . . .
which it finances through the issuance of securities in the form of bonds (senior and
mezzanine trances) and equity.”).
37. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two Markets: Regulation and
Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV.
47, 99 (2020).
38. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4.
39. Cf. Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining that because CLOs are actively
managed, “the CLO issuer may earn additional income by trading loans”).
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market.40 If a loan trades below par, the CLO Manager can purchase the
loan at a discount.41 In this scenario, the CLO Manager buys the loan
based on an assessment of the borrower's long-term repayment
prospects.42 If the loan price recovers, or if the borrower ultimately
repays the loan at par, the CLO stands to recognize returns in excess of
what it initially paid to purchase the loan.43
At the end of the reinvestment period, the CLO enters an
amortization phase in which it pays down its investors' debt obligations
in order of seniority.44 During this stage of the CLO life cycle, payments
made on the loans underlying the CLO, together with any proceeds from
loan sales, must be used to repay the principal of the CLO investors’
debt.45 Investors holding the senior-most tranches of the CLO are repaid
first, followed by junior debtholders.46 Equity investors are paid only
after the debtholders in the senior and junior tranches are repaid in full.47
Investors in a CLO purchase debt according to their individual
risk tolerance.48 This is possible because CLOs offer different classes of
debt to investors in a tranched structure, which consists of highly rated
senior debt, junior or subordinated debt, and an unrated equity piece. 49
40. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining that CLOs are actively
managed investment vehicles in which a CLO Managers assess credit and respond to changes
in the market by substituting loans in the portfolio).
41. See Haunss, supra note 22 (explaining how the purchase of discounted loans could
boost returns).
42. See id. (suggesting that CLO Managers purchase discounted loans because they believe
that, in the long term, the loan will recover and repay at par).
43. Cf. id. (explaining that CLO Managers want discretionary authority to purchase lowpriced loans because they expect some loans to recover in the long term, leading to outsized
returns).
44. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37.
45. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 7 (providing an overview of the amortization
phase in which the CLO manager uses cash flows to repay outstanding CLO debt obligations).
46. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37 (explaining that cash flows received by the CLO
during the amortization period are used to repay investors in order or seniority).
47. See id. (explaining that cash flows received by the CLO during the amortization period
are used to repay investors in order of seniority).
48. See Phillips, supra note 1 (“CLO investors aren’t all the same. They get to pick what
is important to them: low-risk returns or big payday potential.”).
49. The same pool of loans serves as the collateral for each tranche of the CLO. However,
investors in each tranche of the CLO have a different priority on the cash flows generated by
the underlying loans. The senior tranches, usually rated AAA and AA, have the first and
highest claim on payments made to the CLO. The junior tranches, typically rated A, BBB,
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Investors looking to be in the safest part of the CLO structure purchase
the highest rated notes, often rated AAA or AA, while investors with
more tolerance for risk may opt for the junior debt.50 The riskiest portion
of the CLO structure is the equity piece, which is unrated. 51
Priority in payment is also determined according to where the
investor’s debt sits within the CLO structure.52 Money is distributed to
the CLO when corporate borrowers pay interest or principal on the
leveraged loans underlying the CLO.53 These payments are then passed
on to CLO investors according to a “waterfall” in which the senior-most
tranche receives its payment of interest or principal first, followed by the
junior tranche, with any remaining funds flowing to equity investors.54
The interest payments that CLO investors receive on the securities they
purchase vary, as investors in the senior tranche receive a lower rate of
interest than investors in the junior, more risky tranches. 55 Equity
investors assume the most risk because they sit at the bottom of the
payment waterfall 56 and are therefore often paid much higher rates of
interest.57
Certain structural features called credit enhancements exist to
reduce risk and protect the investments of CLO debtholders. 58 The first
of these protections, called interest coverage tests (“IC Tests”), seeks to
ensure that a CLO has sufficient cash flows to service its debt
and BB, are next in line to claim cash flows of the CLO. Finally, an unrated equity tranche
typically receives any excess cash flows. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3.
50. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 7 (describing the risk profile of each tranche
in the CLO structure).
51. See JOHNSON, supra note 30 (suggesting that investors with the highest tolerance for
risk often hold the unrated equity portion of the CLO).
52. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37 (explaining that payments to CLO debtholders
are distributed according to seniority).
53. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining that a CLO satisfies its debt
obligations by passing on the cash it receives from borrowers when they make payments on
their loans).
54. See, e.g., KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (outlining the process by which
payments are made to CLO debt and equity holders).
55. See CAO ET AL, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining how holders of senior CLO debt are paid
lower rates of interest than holders of junior debt and equity).
56. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that equity investors have a claim
on cash flows only after all debt obligations of the CLO have been paid in full).
57. See CAO ET AL, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that equity investors recognize a greater
rate of return than CLO debtholders).
58. KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 4.
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obligations.59 IC Tests are conducted regularly and, in order to pass, the
interest income generated by the CLO’s underlying loans must exceed
the interest it owes to its debtholders. 60 Any excess interest paid to the
CLO is distributed to its equity investors.61
CLOs are also subject to overcollateralization tests (“OC Tests”),
which require the principal value of the loans underlying the CLO to
exceed the value of its outstanding debt obligations.62 When proceeds
from the underlying loans are paid to the CLO, the CLO must satisfy its
OC Tests before passing payments on to its debtholders.63 For instance,
a CLO that must return $500 million in principal to its debt investors
might be required to purchase $625 million of leveraged loans to serve as
collateral for the CLOs debt.64 In this example, the overcollateralization
ratio would be 1.25, and the CLO would have to demonstrate its
compliance with this requirement at the time it seeks to distribute
payments to investors.65
OC Tests are designed to protect the investments of CLO
debtholders, especially those who invest in the senior tranches of the CLO
structure.66 A CLO that fails its OC Test will cut off payments to its
junior debtholders and equity investors in order to direct all cash flows to
holders of the senior-most debt.67 Moreover, any proceeds generated by
the CLO’s underlying loans will be redirected to repay the principal, not

59. JOHNSON, supra note 30.
60. Id.
61. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that equity investors have a

claim on excess cash flows after all debtholders are paid).
62. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 14.
63. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4 (explaining how the CLO structure must pass certain
performance-based tests on payment dates).
64. See SCOTT MINERD ET AL., GUGGENHEIM, UNDERSTANDING COLLATERALIZED LOAN
OBLIGATIONS
3
(2019),
https://www.guggenheiminvestments.com/cmspages/getfile.aspx?guid=4510f36e-7ed34af3-98c5-6b667d7464e9 [https://perma.cc/898C-6SCH] (providing a concrete example of
how OC Tests operate in order to ensure that the CLO has sufficient collateral to service its
obligations to its debt investors).
65. Id.
66. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 14 (describing how a CLO that fails its OC
Test will divert payments to the senior tranche to guarantee the investments of more senior
investors at the expense of investors in other parts of the CLO structure).
67. Id. at 14.
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simply the interest of senior debtholders. 68 In this instance, the CLO
effectively reduces the value of its outstanding debt obligations and can
bring itself back into compliance with its OC Test requirements. 69
Ultimately, the protections for senior debtholders embedded within the
CLO structure70 are designed to ensure that they receive what they paid
for—an investment security that promises low-risk and stable returns.71
B.

Who Holds CLO Securities?

CLO securities are held by a wide variety of investors, ranging
from banks and insurance companies to various institutional investors
like mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension funds.72 The rapid growth
of the CLO market has spurred efforts to identify who holds CLO
securities.73 While it is true that the sizeable amount of CLO exposure
held outside of the regulated banking sector makes the inquiry more
complicated, existing data is sufficient to identify the holders of CLO
securities with some particularity.74
Insurance companies are the largest holders of CLOs, 75 and their
exposure to the market has grown considerably since 2016.76 As of 2018,
insurance companies held $122 billion in CLO securities,77 and this
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 4 (describing the kinds of credit

enhancements embedded within the CLO structure that exist to protect investors).
71. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3–4 (explaining how senior debtholders assume the least
amount of risk and are first to be paid according to the payment “waterfall”).
72. KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 43.
73. See FED. RESERVE BD., FED. NOTES, WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? (2019)
[hereinafter WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES?] (noting the growth of the leveraged loan and
CLO markets and highlighting the importance of identifying who holds CLOs).
74. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (“While full transparency on a private
credit market such as leveraged loans can be difficult to obtain, a window into who is holding
those CLOs is possible . . . .”).
75. Lisa Lee & Katherine Chiglinsky, A $158 Billion CLO Bet is Putting the Insurance
Industry
at
Risk,
BLOOMBERG
(July
30,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-30/a-158-billion-clo-bet-is-putting-theinsurance-industry-at-risk [https://perma.cc/K7C5-WG25].
76. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
77. JENNIFER JOHNSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND
RESEARCH, U.S. INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S EXPOSURE TO COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS
AS
OF
YEAR-END
2018,
at
7
(2019),
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exposure grew to $158 billion by the end of 2019.78 Life insurance
companies are the predominant players, accounting for 77% of all CLO
exposure among insurance companies. 79 However, despite their
increasing exposure, insurance companies invest only a small portion of
their total assets—about 2%—in CLO securities.80
Banks located in the United States and abroad also invest in the
CLO market.81 Depository institutions in the United States hold roughly
$94 billion in CLOs,82 accounting for about 18% of the market.83 Wells
Fargo & Company is the largest holder of CLOs among U.S. banks, with
a reported $34.6 billion in holdings, or about 2% of its total assets.84
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. are the next largest holders,
with $20.5 billion and $18.1 billion of exposure, respectively.85
European and Japanese banks are the most significant holders among
foreign depository institutions, with European banks holding roughly $35
billion of CLO exposure and Japanese banks holding about $113 billion
in CLO securities.86
An array of institutional investors are active in the CLO market,
as pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and asset managers have
sizeable CLO exposures.87 While full transparency into these private
credit markets is difficult to achieve, piecing together available data
provides a workable picture.88 As of December 2018, mutual funds held
roughly $61 billion in CLO securities, and pension funds held just over
https://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/special_report_190618.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ2R-A9LN].
78. Lee & Chiglinsky, supra note 75.
79. JOHNSON, supra note 77.
80. Id. at 1.
81. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
82. CLOs: Who’s Holding (for the Long-Term)?, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clos-whos-holding-for-the-long-term/
[https://perma.cc/GHB2-K2BH].
83. See Lee & Chiglinsky, supra note 75 (providing a chart which reflects the portion of
the CLO market held by banks).
84. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
85. Id.
86. CLOs: Who’s Holding (for the Long-Term)?, supra note 82.
87. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES?, supra note 73 (“Institutional investors,
including . . . mutual funds (16%), and pension funds (10%) held roughly half of Caymanissued CLOs at year-end 2018.”).
88. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
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$22 billion.89 Funds or other investment vehicles, which includes hedge
funds, held more than $20 billion in CLOs in December of 2018.90
Apart from understanding who holds CLOs, it is equally
important to know what kinds of CLO exposure they hold—specifically,
whether banks, insurance companies, and other types of institutional
investors hold mostly senior debt, junior tranches, or CLO equity.91 This
is because exposure type dictates priority of payment,92 and if large,
systemically important institutions—like some of the bank holding
companies mentioned—run the risk of nonpayment, this could lead to
greater systemic risk.93
A desire among depository institutions for low-risk investments
with stable returns has led banks to invest almost exclusively in the senior
tranches of the CLO structure.94 Roughly 95.4% of CLO holdings among
depository institutions are concentrated in the most highly rated CLO
debt, while bank holdings in junior and equity tranches are limited to
3.6% and 1%, respectively.95 CLO exposure among insurance companies
is more dispersed: roughly half of all holdings among insurance
companies are concentrated in senior tranches, with the remaining half
invested in the heightened risk, higher-yielding portion of the CLO
structure.96 However, while insurance companies do hold CLO securities
outside of the safest AAA tranche, 81% of their holdings are rated BBB
or higher.97

89. FED. RESERVE BD., FED. NOTES, WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY
TRANCHE (2020) [hereinafter WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE].
90. Id.
91. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (suggesting that the interest in
understanding who owns CLOs is rooted in concerns about the risk that CLOs may pose to
the broader financial system).
92. KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that payments are made to CLO
investors according to their seniority within the structure).
93. See Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that the stability of the banking system is critical
to the functioning of financial markets).
94. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89
(providing that 95.4% of bank CLO holdings are rated AAA).
95. Id.
96. See id. (providing that CLO holdings among insurance companies are divided between
the senior, junior, and equity portions of the CLO structure).
97. JOHNSON, supra note 77.
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CLO holdings among pension funds and mutual funds are
similarly dispersed throughout the CLO structure. 98 Like banks and
insurance companies, the majority of exposure among these funds is
concentrated in the highest rated CLO debt.99 As of 2018, pension funds
held about $16.9 billion of senior debt, $4.9 billion of junior debt, and
$240 million in CLO equity securities.100 Conversely, mutual funds held
$7.4 billion in CLO equity in December of 2018.101 However, the
majority of mutual fund holdings were also confined to junior and senior
CLO tranches, totaling $12.5 billion and $39.4 billion, respectively. 102
Exposure to the riskiest parts of the CLO structure is held almost
entirely outside of the banking sector, as asset managers, hedge funds,
and other investment vehicles are the largest holders of subordinated debt
and CLO equity.103 In 2018, hedge funds and other investment vehicles
held roughly two-thirds of their total CLO exposure in junior tranches
and CLO equity.104 Moreover, private equity funds, credit opportunity
funds,105 and CLO managers are the primary holders of CLO equity;106
and while a lack of disclosure requirements among these private players
makes obtaining concrete numerical data difficult, S&P estimated in 2019
that 80% of all CLO equity was held by asset managers. 107

98. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89
(reflecting the CLO holdings among pension funds and mutual funds).
99. See id. (providing that mutual funds and pension funds invest 66.4% and 76.6% of their
holdings in senior CLO debt, respectively).
100. See id. (reflecting pension fund exposure to CLO securities, of which roughly 76%
are concentrated in senior tranches, 22% in junior tranches, and about 1% in CLO equity).
101. See id. (evidencing that mutual funds maintain 12.5% of all their CLO holdings in
equity tranches, as of year-end 2018).
102. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89
(pointing to the fact that mutual funds concentrate 66.4% of all their CLO holdings in senior
tranches and 21% in junior tranches).
103. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (“[I]n 2018, asset managers made up
about 40% of the equity buyers, while hedge funds made up closer to 20% and structured
credit funds 25%.”).
104. WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89.
105. See generally, Richard Parkus, Introduction to Credit Opportunity Funds, DEUTSCHE
BANK 1–21 (2007), http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/07_intro/db07_015_021_db_co.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HF2L-FXQV] (providing an overview of credit opportunity funds).
106. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89
(identifying market participants who hold the largest amounts of CLO equity).
107. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
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Historical Performance and the Market Today

CLOs entered the market in the late 1980s,108 but their
performance during the 2008 financial crisis seems to be what many
remember most about CLOs.109 While other structured finance
securities—namely, collateralized debt obligations—proved catastrophic
to the security of the financial system in 2008, CLOs escaped the crisis
largely unscathed. 110 During the last financial crisis, no CLO debt rated
AA or AAA ever defaulted,111 and default rates among junior tranches
were infinitesimal, amounting to less than 0.01%.112 This history of low
default rates among CLOs is especially notable when considered in the
context of the leveraged loan default rates during the recession, which
peaked at just under 11%.113
The CLO market looks markedly different today than it did in its
earliest days, especially in size.114 The value of outstanding CLOs
doubled between 2007 and 2018, reaching $600 billion,115 and estimates
suggest that the U.S. CLO market surged to $642 billion in 2020.116
Nevertheless, default rates have remained low: the rating agency S&P
calculated a 0.41% default rate among 6,100 ratings it issued on over
108. Laila Kollmorgen & Stephen Oh, Seeing Beyond the Complexity: An Introduction to
Collateralized
Loan
Obligations,
PINEBRIDGE
INVS.
(Sept.
19,
2019),
https://www.pinebridge.com/en/investor-types/default/ [https://perma.cc/QNF6-7MS3].
109. See Joe Rennison, Coronavirus Sell-Off Puts Faith in CLOs to the Test, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ed2dc3a9-c004-4c37-a5e3-715c1d05a2e6
[https://perma.cc/TJ6S-2HSW] (“People tend to look backward in history saying CLOs
survived the last financial crisis.”).
110. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 1–2 (comparing CLOs to CDOs and referring to CLOs
as “survivors” of the 2008 financial crisis).
111. A CLO indenture will define what constitutes a default. A default may occur, for
example, if a CLO fails to make a payment due on its senior debt obligations, or if the CLO
fails to meet its overcollateralization requirements. Brown, supra note 3.
112. Sally Bakewell & Lisa Lee, CLO Engineering Is No Match for Covid-19 as Payments
Get
Cut-Off,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
20,
2020,
10:59
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/clo-engineering-is-no-match-forcovid-19-as-payments-get-cut-off [https://perma.cc/3F3X-J3XP].
113. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (reporting that the leveraged loan default
rate peaked at 10.81% in November 2009).
114. See Rennison, supra note 12 (explaining that the CLO market has experienced
significant growth since the 2008 financial crisis).
115. Id.
116. KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 47.
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1,100 CLO transactions.117 This represents just over four tranches for
every 1,000 rated.118 Moreover, the annual default rate among leveraged
loans has remained low,119 with a 2.93% historical average that even
dropped to 1% for a period in 2019.120
III. CRITICISMS
In recent years, the modest praise that CLOs received for their
success in weathering the last financial crisis has largely taken a backseat
to the mounting concerns over the $700 billion asset class. 121 Criticism
directed towards CLOs can be reduced to two interrelated ideas. First,
CLOs are often blamed for encouraging unsustainably high levels of
corporate debt.122 Second, CLO demand for leveraged loans has
purportedly fostered a leveraged lending environment in which issuers
can secure loans on terms that are increasingly adverse to lenders.123

117. From mid-1990 until 2014, the credit rating agency S&P issued more than 6,100
ratings on over 1,100 U.S. CLO transactions. In 2014, S&P evaluated the performance of all
the CLO tranches they rated and concluded that default rates were notably low. S&P: CLOs
Show Strong Historic Performance with Few Defaults, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Jan. 31,
2014, 7:02 PM) https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/leveraged-loan-news/sp-report-clos-show-strong-historic-performance-with-fewdefaults [https://perma.cc/GG9W-DUNM].
118. Id.
119. The CLO market is inextricably tied to the health of the leveraged loan market. CLOs
satisfy their debt obligations by passing on payments received from leveraged loan borrowers
whenever they pay down their loan. If leveraged loan borrowers default on their obligations,
CLOs may not have the cash to make payments on their outstanding debt. Therefore, low
default rates among leveraged loan borrowers ultimately benefit the CLO market. See FIN.
STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 3–6.
120. Despite Aging Credit Cycle, Near-Term Spike in Leveraged Loan Defaults Unlikely,
S&P
GLOBAL
MKT.
INTEL.
(June
10,
2019,
9:00
AM),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/ [https://perma.cc/HK6C-7DAP].
121. See Phillips, supra note 1 (acknowledging that CLOs performed well during the last
financial crisis but focusing predominantly on the threats that CLOs pose to the health of the
financial system).
122. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (calling out CLOs for their role in fueling
unsustainably high levels of corporate debt).
123. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“[A]s CLOs competed for loans to invest in,
borrowers were able to . . . demand looser terms . . . .”).
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CLO Demand Fuels Massive Corporate Debt

Perhaps the most obvious measure of the increase in demand for
CLOs is the growth of the market since 2008.124 The amount of CLOs
outstanding has more than doubled compared to its pre-crisis peak of
$256 billion.125 This demand has been driven, at least in part, by
historically low interest rates.126 Both CLOs and the leveraged loans they
hold are floating rate instruments that offer yield-hungry investors a
spread above a base rate.127 Historically, the base rate has been the
London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”). 128 Spreads above LIBOR on
leveraged loans can range from 1.75% to as high as 7%. 129 CLOs offer
spreads above LIBOR that increase in lockstep with the amount of risk a
CLO investor assumes.130 For instance, investors who hold CLO debt in
the subordinated part of the structure will be paid a spread above LIBOR
that is greater than the spread paid to investors with exposure to the
highest rated AAA tranche.131 However, regardless of the exact amount
of spread, CLOs often provide investors with higher returns, 132 especially
as compared to similarly rated assets.133 Therefore, in low interest rate
environments, the higher-yielding assets of the CLO market are
especially attractive to yield-hungry investors.134

124. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that the CLO market has
doubled in size since the 2008 financial crisis).
125. See US CLO Issuance Hits All-Time Record, Topping $125B, S&P GLOBAL M KT.
INTEL.
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/
[https://perma.cc/6LM9-D37Q] (reporting that the CLO market peaked at $256 billion before
the 2008 financial crisis and has since grown to become a $600 billion market).
126. See id. (suggesting that historically low interest rates have driven investors towards
the higher-yielding CLO market).
127. CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
128. LIBOR has historically served as the base rate. However, it is expected that LIBOR
will be discontinued by the end of 2021 and will be replaced with an alternative reference rate
to serve as a benchmark. Id. at 2, 4.
129. See Aaron Weinman, Spreads Widen in Choppy US Leveraged Loan Market, REUTERS
(Sept.
20,
2019,
9:28
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usloans-spreadsidUSL2N26B0FV [https://perma.cc/DN9Z-EZG5] (highlighting the fact that spreads on
leveraged loans can be as low as 175 basis points or, in some cases, as high as 700 basis
points).
130. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (“The spread decreases with the relative seniority
of a note within the CLO capital structure.”).
131. See id. (explaining that AAA-rated CLO debt pays a lower rate of interest as compared
to the higher interest rates paid to investors in the junior tranche).
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CLO demand is relevant because it has fueled, or at least
reinforced, the growth of the leveraged loan market. 135 CLOs purchase
approximately 60% of all leveraged loans and are thus the largest buyer
of below investment grade corporate debt.136 When demand for CLOs
increases, the demand for leveraged loans follows suit, as leveraged loans
are the bedrock of the CLO structure. 137 In recent years, demand for
leveraged loans among CLOs afforded corporate borrowers easy access
to a loan market teeming with eager investors.138 As a result, borrowers
have been able to incur large amounts of debt that could ultimately prove
difficult to repay.139 The roughly $1.3 trillion of outstanding corporate
debt financed by leveraged loans—and fueled by CLO demand—
contributes to a persistent fear that business debt is approaching
unsustainable levels.140

132. According to data from Wells Fargo, collected as of March 25, 2020, AAA-rated CLO
notes paid spreads above benchmarks in the mid-to-high 300 basis point area, meaning an
extra 3 percentage points in return. A similarly rated corporate bond paid about 142 basis
points more than its benchmark on the same date. Sally Bakewell, Why Leveraged Loans,
CLOS Feed Worries in Virus Slump, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:38 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/why-leveraged-loans-clos-feedworries-in-virus-slump-quicktake [https://perma.cc/8PAH-YEND].
133. See US CLO Issuance Hits All-Time Record, Topping $125B, supra note 125
(suggesting that yields in the CLO market have historically been higher as compared to other
similarly rated assets).
134. See id. (suggesting that investors in low-interest rate environments flock to the higheryielding CLO market).
135. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (criticizing the growth of the leveraged loan market
and suggesting that CLOs have enabled the expansion).
136. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
137. Cf. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 98 (highlighting the fact that the CLO and
leveraged loan markets move in “lockstep”).
138. See Brown & Salander, supra note 3 (referencing strong investor demand and a
“borrower-friendly” market).
139. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“[A]s CLOs competed for loans to invest in,
borrowers were able to take on more debt per dollar of earnings . . . .”).
140. See Jerome Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Business Debt
and
Our
Dynamic
Financial
System
(May
20,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20190520a.htm
[https://perma.cc/H2YY-BV7X] (“Business debt has clearly reached a level that should give
businesses and investors reason to pause and reflect. If financial and economic conditions
were to deteriorate, overly indebted firms could well face severe strains.”).
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CLO Demand Leads to a Deterioration in Underwriting
Standards

Concerns about high levels of corporate debt are almost
inevitably coupled with warnings about the quality of the loans extended
to borrowers.141 CLOs factor prominently in this discussion because
CLO demand for leveraged loans is largely seen as a driving force behind
deteriorating underwriting standards.142 The erosion of lending standards
is best reflected in the rise of covenant-lite loans and in the proliferation
of aggressive provisions in loan documentation (“Credit
Agreements”).143
1. Covenant-Lite Loans
Loans are considered covenant-lite when they lack requirements
compelling borrowers to meet certain performance criteria on a monthly
or quarterly basis; failure to meet these requirements can place a borrower
in default.144 Maintenance covenants, while onerous for borrowers, offer
insights as to a borrower’s ability to repay its loans.145 Thus, the lack of
covenants in a Credit Agreement is often seen as a benefit to borrowers
granted at the expense of lenders.146 Prior to the 2008 financial crisis,
141. See Joy Wiltermuth & Kristen Haunss, Yellen Warns of Corporate Distress, Economic
Fallout, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yellendistressed/yellen-warns-of-corporate-distress-economic-fallout-idUSKCN1QG2CZ
[https://perma.cc/R3DV-B3ZR] (“At the same time corporate buyout leverage [increased]. . .
lender protections weakened . . . .”).
142. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“As CLOs competed for loans to invest in,
borrowers were able to take on more debt per dollar of earnings at lower rates, and to demand
looser terms, known as covenants.”).
143. See Kristen Haunss, Regulators Concerned About Material Loosening in Leveraged
Loan Market, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regsloans/regulators-concerned-about-material-loosening-in-leveraged-loan-marketidUKL2N1X41JA?edition-redirect=ca
[https://perma.cc/7GDL-CTXS]
(discussing
covenant-lite loans and the incorporation of aggressive Credit Agreement provisions that pose
risks to lenders).
144. ERIC GOODISON & MARGOT WAGNER, COVENANT-LITE LOANS: OVERVIEW 1, 5 (2019),
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3978887/goodison_wagner_practicallaw_aug2019_updat
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS95-FDT6].
145. See id. (explaining covenants as beneficial to lenders because of their ability to alert
lenders before a borrower defaults on their loan).
146. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 8 (suggesting that covenant-lite loans are a
benefit to borrowers and a detriment to lenders).
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covenant-lite loans represented only a small fraction of the market. 147 By
contrast, roughly 80% of leveraged loans today are covenant-lite.148
Competition among CLO investors for leveraged loans has effectively
allowed borrowers to market covenant-lite credit facilities without the
risk that lenders will demand more traditional lender protections or refuse
to lend altogether.149
2. Aggressive Provisions in Credit Agreements
Amidst a backdrop of surging demand for leveraged loans and
CLOs, traditional lender protections in Credit Agreements have been
eroded by terms that give borrowers greater flexibility.150 Regulators and
market participants identified three specific areas in Credit Agreements
where new, more borrower-friendly terms threaten to undermine the
protections that secured lenders have long relied on when providing loans
to below investment grade corporate borrowers. 151 First, Credit
Agreements have incorporated provisions—incremental facilities—that
allow borrowers to incur additional debt, often without consulting
existing lenders.152 This ability to tack on additional debt is especially
147. See Sam Goldfarb & Avantika Chilkoti, Regulators, Investors Zero in on Corporate
Debt
Market,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
28,
2019,
10:14
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-investors-zero-in-on-corporate-debt-market11558958401 [https://perma.cc/B47Y-HBWQ] (reporting that in 2006 only 6% of loans were
covenant-lite); Covenant-Lite Leveraged Loans: After Default, Whither Recoveries?, S&P
GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (July 23, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/latest-news-headlines/leveraged-loan-news/covenant-lite-leveraged-loans-defaultwhither-recoveries [https://perma.cc/LFV8-VJ23] (noting that in 2007 only 29% of the
leveraged loan market was considered covenant-lite).
148. Phillips, supra note 1 ("So-called covenant lite loans now account for roughly 80
percent of the new leveraged loans on the market.”).
149. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 8 (“[D]eals have experienced looser
covenants, likely driven by high availability of funding and competition for loan mandates by
arrangers.”).
150. See id. at 7–8 (describing the erosion of traditional lender protections in Credit
Agreements and attributing this development to a competitive market).
151. See Haunss, supra note 143 (describing some of the borrower-friendly terms being
incorporated into Credit Agreements).
152. See Gary L. Storck & Mark D. Sheely, Leveraged Lending: Evolution, Growth and
Heightened
Risk,
in
16
SUPERVISORY
INSIGHTS
10,
15
(2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sifall19/si-fall-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7H9-A4XF] (“[M]any credit agreements allow borrowers the right to
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detrimental in the context of below investment grade borrowers because,
as indicated by their low credit rating, these borrowers already carry large
debt loads.153 In the event of a downturn, these highly indebted borrowers
will likely have little cash on their balance sheets to repay creditors. 154
Second, under most Credit Agreements, a borrower may take certain
actions—like incur debt—only if it can establish that it is in compliance
with ratios that measure its debt to earnings.155 However, many Credit
Agreements now contain provisions that allow a borrower to artificially
inflate its earnings by adding back certain expenses or anticipated cost
savings.156 Research indicates that these adjustments often overstate a
borrower’s earnings and thus understate its debt to earnings ratio, 157
allowing borrowers greater flexibility to take actions that would
otherwise be prohibited under their loan agreements. 158 Finally, many
Credit Agreements now allow corporate borrowers to transfer assets
outside the credit group159 thus diluting the collateral that can be claimed
obtain additional debt without the current lender’s approval, an ability known as incremental
facilities.”).
153. See id. at 10–11 (explaining that leveraged borrowers typically have high levels of
debt and below investment grade credit ratings).
154. See id. at 10 (“[H]igh debt levels coupled with lower levels of liquidity may reduce
businesses’ flexibility to respond to changes in economic conditions.”).
155. See GOODISON & WAGNER, supra note 144, at 2 (providing that many Credit
Agreements allow borrowers to incur an unlimited amount of debt if the borrower meets an
incurrence test, like a maximum leverage ratio).
156. See Aaron Weinman, US Investors Sound Alarm over Projected Add-Backs, REUTERS
(May 9, 2019, 2:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/investors-addbacks/us-investorssound-alarm-over-projected-add-backs-idUSL2N22L1MK [https://perma.cc/Z2ZE-EPYQ]
(“Borrowers . . . have in recent years ramped up their usage of add-backs, or projected cost
savings . . . in a bid to make leverage calculations more palatable to both investors and
regulators.”).
157. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 9 (explaining how add-backs can artificially
increase earnings and thus understate a borrower’s debt to earnings ratio).
158. See The Arc of the Covenants, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/the-arc-of-the-covenants/
[https://perma.cc/9URGSJ9V] (suggesting that the impact of add-backs “cascade” through other credit agreement
provisions, making many of the activities governed by leverage ratios easier to undertake).
159. A borrower may transfer assets away from secured lenders who have a claim on those
assets by moving them to an entity called an unrestricted subsidiary. Unrestricted
subsidiaries, unlike restricted subsidiaries, are not parties to the Credit Agreement. This
means that unrestricted subsidiaries are not subject to the limitations imposed on borrowers
under the Credit Agreement, and these unrestricted subsidiaries can be used to protect assets
from seizure in the event a borrower cannot repay their loan. Brad Cheek, Note, Tearin’ Up
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by lenders in the event of default.160 The vast majority of Credit
Agreements contain carve-outs that permit borrowers to transfer assets to
subsidiaries that are not a party to the Credit Agreement, up to a stated
amount.161 Individually, these borrower-friendly provisions undermine
the safety of lender investments.162 However, taken together, these terms
amplify the risk lenders assume when extending credit to below
investment grade corporate borrowers.163 CLO demand for leveraged
loans has allowed borrowers to incorporate some or, in some cases, all of
these provisions into their Credit Agreements.164
C.

The Regulatory Landscape

The fact that demand from unregulated investors—like CLOs—
prompted massive growth in the leveraged loan market and the
deterioration of underwriting standards did not go unnoticed by federal
regulators.165 In 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(“Federal Reserve”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) jointly issued Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending
(“Guidance”).166 The Guidance was designed to provide agencyiHeart: The Recent Trend with Troubled Companies and The Unrestricted Subsidiary
Transfer Tactic, 23 N.C. Banking Inst. 271, 273–74 (2019).
160. See Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Debt Machine: Are Risks Piling up in Leveraged
Loans?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZP46-JBN6]
(describing how an increasing number of credit agreements come with “few of the lender
protections that were once standard,” and explaining how recent loan documentation often
includes the ability to “move assets out of the reach of lenders.”).
161. See id. (“Of the top 20 private equity-sponsored loan deals in 2018 approximately 80
per cent contained a loophole that could see loan investors’ claim on collateral diluted . . . .”).
162. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 7–11 (examining the weaknesses in credit
documentation and explaining how these weaknesses can disadvantage lenders).
163. Id. at 7–11.
164. See Rennison, supra note 12 (“[S]trong demand from CLOs has helped to shred many
of the investor protections that were once routinely embedded in loan documents . . . .”).
165. See Joint Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Agencies Issue Updated Leveraged
Lending
Guidance
(Mar.
21,
2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20130321a.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z8NQ-TW4S] (announcing the release of updated leveraged lending
guidance in response to the deterioration of loan underwriting standards).
166. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17766 (Mar. 22,
2013).
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supervised institutions with “high-level principles related to safe and
sound leveraged lending activities.”167 Specifically, the Guidance urged
regulated lenders not to extend loans that could not be repaid within five
to seven years, and to avoid financing any loan that would elevate a
borrower’s debt to earnings ratio above six times.168 While the Guidance
may have curtailed leveraged lending among banks for a short time,169 it
was ultimately an imperfect attempt to stymie the growth of the leveraged
loan market and enforce stricter lending standards among banks.170
The Guidance was incapable of influencing underwriting
standards in the long-term because federal regulators backed away from
the Guidance171 after it was challenged in 2017 and subsequently
reviewed by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). 172
According to the GAO, the Guidance constituted a rule that needed to
comply with the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) before it could be
made effective. 173 Rather than reissue the Guidance to conform with the
requirements under the CRA, federal regulators took the opposite
approach.174 In September of 2018, the Federal Reserve, in collaboration
with four other agencies, issued an Interagency Statement Clarifying the
167. Id.
168. See id. at 17773, 17775 (explaining the agency’s view of what constitutes “adequate

repayment capacity” and suggesting that corporate leverage above six times “raises
concerns”).
169. See Sooji Kim et al., Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?,
FED.
RES.
BANK
N.Y.
(May
16,
2016),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/did-the-supervisory-guidance-onleveraged-lending-work.html [https://perma.cc/4GVS-46PU] (reporting a decline in
leveraged lending among banks after the passage of the Guidance).
170. See Kristen Haunss, Regulatory Crackdown Unlikely in US Leveraged Loan Market,
REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019, 11:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regulatory-crackdownunlikely-in-us-leve/regulatory-crackdown-unlikely-in-us-leveraged-loan-marketidUSL1N2120Q6 [https://perma.cc/3242-KDXB] (suggesting that the Guidance had an
“insufficient effect” on tightening underwriting standards in the leveraged loan market).
171. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (criticizing federal regulators from backing away
from the Guidance instead of building upon it).
172. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-329272, APPLICABILITY OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT TO INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING (2017)
(noting that the GAO reviewed the Guidance at the request of Senator Pat Toomey).
173. Id.
174. See Hannah Lang et al., 6 Policy Responses to Leveraged Lending Fears, AM. BANKER
(June 6, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/6-policy-responses-toleveraged-lending-fears [https://perma.cc/4JCP-DU3K] (“The regulators could have
resubmitted the guidance, but they did not take that road.”).
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Role of Supervisory Guidance (“Clarifying Statement”). 175
The
Clarifying Statement established that supervisory guidance—like the
2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending—does not have the
force of law and confirmed that no enforcement actions would be taken
based on guidance alone.176 Moreover, in November of 2020, the OCC
proposed a rule to codify the Clarifying Statement.177 With this, the
Guidance was effectively nullified and therefore incapable of addressing
concerns about underwriting standards in the leveraged loan market.178
The CLO market was more directly impacted by federal
regulation in 2014 when the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and the Federal Reserve each issued a Credit Risk Retention
Rule (“Risk Retention Rule”).179 Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), the SEC and
federal banking agencies were authorized to prescribe regulations
requiring securitizers of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) to retain at least
5% of the credit risk in assets that they transferred, sold, or conveyed to
a third-party.180 Under the Risk Retention Rule, CLO Managers were
classified as securitizers. 181 This designation required CLO Managers to
retain a 5% interest in the CLOs that they managed. 182 While the Risk
Retention Rule was implemented to align the interests of investors and

175. FED. RESERVE BD., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE
ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter CLARIFYING STATEMENT].
176. See id. (“Unlike a law or regulation, supervisory guidance does not have the force and
effect of law, and the agencies do not take enforcement actions based on supervisory
guidance.”).
177. Role of Supervisory Guidance, 85 Fed. Reg. 70512, 70512 (proposed Nov. 5, 2020).
178. See Lang et al., supra note 174 (explaining how the Guidance was never implemented
as a rule and was thus, “effectively nullified”).
179. See Credit Risk Retention (Regulation RR), 12 C.F.R. § 244.1 (2020) (providing the
Federal Reserve’s regulation to implement credit risk retention as required by Dodd-Frank);
Credit Risk Retention, 17 C.F.R. § 246.1 (2020) (providing the SEC’s regulation to implement
credit risk retention as required by Dodd-Frank).
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
941(b), 15 U.S.C. 78o-11(c), (g)-(h) (2018).
181. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77650–51, 77653, 77659 (Dec. 24,
2014) (“[T]he agencies believe that CLO managers are clearly included within the statutory
definition of ‘securitizer’. . . .”).
182. Id. at 77651.
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securitizers,183 it had another important effect on the CLO market: smaller
CLO managers without the capital required to retain the mandatory 5%
interest were forced out of the market.184
Ultimately, the impact of the Risk Retention Rule on the CLO
market was short-lived.185 In 2018, federal regulation of the CLO market
was significantly curtailed pursuant to a successful lawsuit brought by the
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (“LSTA”). 186 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sided with the LSTA in
their suit against the SEC and the Federal Reserve, which challenged the
Risk Retention Rule as applied to CLO Managers.187 The court held that
CLO Managers are not in fact securitizers under Section 941 of DoddFrank, and this finding exempted CLO Managers from the requirements
of the Risk Retention Rule.188 The 2020 downturn, therefore,
materialized after federal regulation of the leveraged loan and CLO
markets—in the form of the Guidance and the Risk Retention Rule—had
been significantly scaled back. 189

183. See Elliot Gantz & Phillip Black, CLO Risk Retention: A Case Study in Regulatory
Indiscretion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 75, 75 (2020) (explaining the “potential conflict of
interest” between loan originators and investors in the ABS market).
184. See Risk Retention Could Hurt CLO Investors by Increasing Correlation, Decreasing
Diversity,
LOAN SYNDICATIONS
& TRADING ASS’N
(July
27,
2016),
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/risk-retention-could-hurt-clo-investors-by-increasingcorrelation-decreasing-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/E3V9-6PJS] (explaining that the risk
retention requirement is likely to reduce CLO formation, especially among smaller managers
without sufficient capital to purchase and retain 5% of the notes of new CLOs).
185. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Risk Retention Now Just a Memory as Final Appeal
Deadline Passes, REUTERS (May 11, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usclos-supremecourt/clo-risk-retention-now-just-a-memory-as-final-appeal-deadline-passesidUSKBN1IC21S [https://perma.cc/2L8F-ZC5J] (reporting that CLO Managers “are now
completely free” from the requirements imposed by the Risk Retention Rule).
186. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that CLO
Managers are not subject to the Risk Retention Rule).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 222.
189. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d 220 (holding that CLO Managers
are not subject to the requirements of the Risk Retention Rule); CLARIFYING STATEMENT,
supra note 175 (explaining that supervisory guidance does not have the force of law).
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IV. CLO PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2020 DOWNTURN
A.

The CLO Response to the 2020 Downturn

In light of the criticism directed towards the CLO market, the
economic downturn wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic should have
been disastrous for CLOs—and some predicted that it would be.190 The
pandemic ended the longest economic expansion in United States
history191—a prosperity that may have sanctioned inaction with respect
to longstanding concerns about the CLO and leveraged loan markets.192
In response to the spread of COVID-19 and the nationwide lockdown,
many businesses closed their doors, flights and vacations were cancelled,
and life seemed to come to a rapid halt.193 As a result, the pandemic
caused material damage to businesses and companies across almost all
corporate sectors.194 For many corporate borrowers, revenue shortfalls,
supply chain disruption, and reduced demand were commonplace when
lockdown measures took effect.195
Speculative-grade corporate
borrowers, whose high debt loads become difficult to repay when

190. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (discussing the potential for a bank collapse caused by
distress in the CLO market).
191. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schulze, The Coronavirus Recession is Unlike any Economic
Downturn
in
US
History,
CNBC
(Apr.
8,
2020,
12:33
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-recession-is-unlike-any-economicdownturn-in-us-history.html (explaining that, prior to the pandemic, GDP had expanded for
a record 126 months, unemployment was at a fifty-year low, economic growth was steady at
around 2%, and stock markets were at record highs).
192. See Phillips, supra note 1 (suggesting that there are many reasons to be concerned
about the CLO market but that, because the economy is strong, there has been less incentive
to take them seriously).
193. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (describing the broad impact of the COVID-19
pandemic across industries).
194. See Hannah Zhang, Leveraged Finance: U.S. Leveraged Finance Q2 2020 Update:
Recovery Ratings Maintain Social Distance from Credit Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic, S&P
GLOBAL
RATINGS
(July
23,
2020,
2:59
PM),
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200723-leveraged-finance-u-sleveraged-finance-q2-2020-update-recovery-ratings-maintain-social-distance-from-credi11577544 [ https://perma.cc/SE6D-5VF2] (“[T]he pandemic has caused material damage to
the business and creditworthiness of companies in almost all corporate sectors . . . .”).
195. See Micah Maidenberg, Fewer Products, Localized Production—Companies Seek
Supply-Chain Solutions, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 26, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-disrupted-supply-chains-that-companies-are-stillfixing-11587893401 [https://perma.cc/Y9MQ-4G2U] (reporting on supply chain disruptions
and a decline in earnings among businesses as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic).
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revenues decline,196 unfortunately bore the brunt of the pandemicinduced economic damage. 197
Due to their reliance on corporate debt repayment, the leveraged
loan and CLO markets did experience volatility, especially in the earliest
months of the lockdown.198 Specifically, in the leveraged loan market,
the COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed three troubling trends: downgrading
of loans, increased default rates, and trading price decreases. 199 First, a
staggering number of leveraged loans were downgraded by ratings
agencies, which generally reflected concerns that leveraged borrowers
would be unable to repay their debt.200 Between March and July, the
rating agency S&P downgraded more than 900 corporate borrowers. 201
Moreover, from March through May, the pace of loan downgrades at
S&P outpaced upgrades by a rate of 43:1, prompting fears that a wave of
corporate defaults would soon materialize.202 Ultimately, default rates
among leveraged loan borrowers did increase—albeit not
catastrophically—during the earliest months of the year, marking the
second strain on the leveraged loan market induced by the COVID-19
196. See Lang, supra note 21 (“Highly leveraged companies that either experience a
disruption in their supply chains or reduced demand because of the coronavirus could have
difficulty repaying their loans . . . .”).
197. See Zhang, supra note 194 (suggesting that below investment grade corporate
borrowers “bore the brunt” of the pandemic-induced economic damage).
198. See Haunss, supra note 19 (“[A]s coronavirus began to spread around the world,
market volatility hit the CLO and loan asset classes.”).
199. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (highlighting the decline in leveraged loan prices
instigated by the COVID-19 pandemic); Rachelle Kakouris, In Grim Sign, US Leveraged
Loan Defaults Set Record in April, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (May 6, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/ingrim-sign-us-leveraged-loan-defaults-set-record-in-april-58437664 [https://perma.cc/NR5JT9D3] (reporting a record number of defaults in April of 2020); Yoruk Bahceli, U.S.
Leveraged Loan Downgrade Ratio Five Times Worse Than 2008-09, REUTERS (June 4, 2020,
11:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-leveraged-loans-gr/u-sleveraged-loan-downgrade-ratio-five-times-worse-than-2008-09-idUSKBN23B2H8
[https://perma.cc/7LN4-79ZS] (describing a spike in leveraged loan downgrades).
200. See Bahceli, supra note 199 (describing the record level of leveraged loan downgrades
as a response to pandemic-induced stress in the loan market).
201. Zhang, supra note 194.
202. See Rachelle Kakouris, US Leveraged Loan Downgrade Ratio Hits Staggering 43:1
as Pandemic Stalls Market, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (June 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/7J3FRLJV]
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/us-leveraged-loan-downgrade-ratio-hits-staggering-43-1-as-pandemic-stallsmarket-58928285 (“As a leading indicator, rising downgrades also typically precede a period
of increased defaults.”).
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pandemic.203 In April, the total number of defaults reached eleven, which
surpassed the previous monthly record of ten set in October 2009. 204
Finally, the price of leveraged loans trading in the secondary market fell
dramatically between February and March. 205 For instance, leveraged
loan issuer Cirque du Soleil saw the price of its loan tumble to 69.5 cents
on the dollar—down from 92.5 cents in February—when it was forced to
cancel shows due to the pandemic.206 Falling loan prices can affect CLO
managers trying to trade out of nonperforming loans, as they may be
forced to sell at a significant discount.207 This can negatively impact the
outstanding value of the debt that CLOs hold for purposes of meeting the
overcollateralization requirements imposed by their OC Tests.208
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic
downturn was also felt directly in the CLO market.209 In response to
largescale ratings downgrades in the leveraged loan market, the three
major credit rating agencies turned their attention to the CLOs holding
these loans and placed roughly 2,400 CLO debt obligations under review
for possible downgrade.210 In addition, some CLOs failed their internal
performance tests in response to widespread loan downgrades and market
volatility.211 Notably, a CLO triggered its senior OC Test for the first
203. See Kakouris, supra note 199 (highlighting an increase in defaults among borrowers
during the month of April but acknowledging that the default rate remains below the historical
average).
204. Id.
205. CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 1.
206. Podkul & Davies, supra note 7.
207. See Adam Tempkin, Over 10% of CLOs Fail Collateral Tests, Putting Payouts at
Risk,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
23,
2020,
4:50
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/over-10-of-clos-fail-collateral-testsputting-payouts-at-risk [https://perma.cc/V5TY-RLB2] (explaining how loans sold at a
discount can reduce the value of the CLO portfolio).
208. Id.
209. See Cezary Podkul, Expected Surge of CLO Downgrades Slow to Arrive, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 28, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/expected-surge-of-clo-downgradesslow-to-arrive-11598653875 [https://perma.cc/2VSN-GNX5] (noting that CLO debt
obligations were placed under review for downgrade by ratings agencies in response to
economic volatility caused by the COVID-19 pandemic).
210. See id. (“After the coronavirus pandemic shut many businesses this spring, the three
major credit-ratings firms placed about 2,400 bonds tied to pools of corporate loans on review
for possible downgrades.”).
211. See Tempkin, supra note 207 (reporting that, according to one analysis, 13% of
roughly 750 CLOs failed their junior OC Tests in April).

486

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

time since 2008.212 Finally, new CLO issuance decreased substantially,
especially as compared to prior years. 213 In the first three months of 2020,
there was just $15.2 billion of new issuance, which was $14.1 billion
short of the $29.3 billion issued during the same quarter in 2019.214 The
CLO market freeze reflected investor concerns tied to falling loan prices
and large-scale corporate downgrades. 215
Despite experiencing a bout of volatility in the earliest months of
the year, CLOs and the leveraged loan market rebounded well. 216 The
wave of potential CLO downgrades that seemed likely at the beginning
of the year largely failed to materialize.217 Ultimately, many CLO
securities had their ratings affirmed or were otherwise downgraded only
one notch.218 On the new issue front, volume gradually picked back up,
with $3.9 billion of CLOs issued in April, $6 billion in May, and $8.2
billion in June.219 Moreover, Wells Fargo adjusted its 2020 U.S. CLO
issuance forecast to $65 billion, up from the $50 billion it estimated in
May.220 Finally, the leveraged loan space also saw a gradual recovery 221
212. Alexander Saeedy, For 1st Time Since 2008, a CLO Triggers its Senior
Overcollateralization Test, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/for1st-time-since-2008-a-clo-triggers-its-senior-overcollateralization-test-58047116
[https://perma.cc/H6PR-QEEL].
213. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Issuance Falls 48% as Rush of Loan Downgrades Threatens
Investor
Distributions,
REUTERS
(Apr.
17,
2020,
9:55
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/cloissuance-ccc/clo-issuance-falls-48-as-rush-of-loandowngrades-threatens-investor-distributions-idINL1N2C50BG
[https://perma.cc/56SK9RBL] (describing how CLO issuance slowed in the earliest months of 2020 in response to
the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic).
214. Id.
215. See id. (suggesting that the CLO market froze due to falling loan prices and a wave of
corporate downgrades).
216. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 47 (explaining that CLO issuance has
“rebounded” to almost pre-outbreak levels and suggesting that the leveraged loan market has
stabilized).
217. Podkul, supra note 209.
218. Id.
219. Haunss, supra note 19.
220. Id.
221. See Jonathan Hemingway, US Leveraged Loan Issuance Rebounds in Q3 after
Pandemic-Induced Slump, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/usleveraged-loan-issuance-rebounds-in-q3-after-pandemic-induced-slump-60534463
[https://perma.cc/4V4D-46LM] (“Issuance in the U.S. leveraged loan market rebounded in
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in a move that was important for the health of the CLO market.222 After
tumbling in the early months of 2020, loan prices ultimately
rebounded, 223 and new issuance ticked back up, even if in fits and
starts.224 After leveraged loan issuance bottomed out at a four-year low
of $44.5 billion in the second quarter, the market recovered, with new
issuance totaling $71 billion in the third quarter of 2020. 225
While it may be years before the CLO market is as active as it
was before the COVID-19 pandemic, it appears as though CLOs have
emerged, yet again, as “survivors”226—only this time in reference to their
handling of the 2020 economic downturn.227 At the very least, CLOs did
not catalyze the next banking crisis or severely destabilize the U.S.
financial system,228 as some feared. 229 The reason why CLOs—in spite
of the criticisms they face—survived the volatility of the 2020 downturn
without damaging the financial market is twofold. First, government
intervention in the form of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (“TALF”) helped to reinvigorate the CLO market after it froze in
the earliest months of the year.230 However, the impact of TALF was

the third quarter, as stabilizing conditions and increasing investor demand have drawn
borrowers off the sidelines.”).
222. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 28 (“[T]he leveraged loan and CLO
markets include direct and indirect forms of interconnectedness . . . . Direct
interconnectedness arises from . . . origination and distribution of leveraged loans to
securitization by CLO managers . . . .”).
223. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 48 (discussing the rebound in leveraged loan
prices).
224. See Hemingway, supra note 221 (noting the $71 billion of loans issued in the third
quarter of 2020 and suggesting that this increase reflects a rebound in the leveraged loan
market).
225. Id.
226. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 1 (highlighting that CLOs were deemed survivors of
the last financial crisis).
227. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 48 ([W]hile the COVID-19 economic shock
initially halted new CLO issuance, the market appears headed for recovery.”).
228. See id. at 49 (explaining that CLOs performed well when confronted with the COVID19 induced economic downturn).
229. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (suggesting that weaknesses in the CLO market could lead
to a financial collapse reminiscent of the 2008 financial crisis).
230. See id. (explaining that TALF will have a modest, but positive, impact on the CLO
market).
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largely symbolic,231 and the survival of the CLO market can be mostly
attributed to something else—the strength of the CLO structure. 232 In the
midst of the 2020 downturn, protections embedded in the CLO structure
worked as intended; the OC Tests designed to safeguard the investments
of AAA investors deployed properly233 and protected the investments of
banks—whose losses could have spelled financial trouble.234
B.

The Modest Impact of TALF on the CLO Market

In response to the economic hardship brought on by the
pandemic, the Federal Reserve exercised its power under Section 13(3)
of the Federal Reserve Act 235 to revive TALF.236 The first iteration of
TALF, launched in 2008, responded to the financial crisis by providing
loans to investors that could be used to purchase eligible asset-backed
securities (“ABS”). 237 When it was reintroduced in March of 2020,
TALF again sought to encourage the issuance of ABS,238 which

231. See Lisa Lee, CLOs, Leveraged Loans Get Partial Lifeline in Fed’s TALF Changes,
BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2020, 5:14 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0512/clos-leveraged-loans-get-partial-lifeline-in-fed-s-talf-changes [https://perma.cc/EG9N4NNU] (suggesting that TALF’s impact on the CLO market will be fairly limited).
232. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 10 (suggesting that CLOs structures are designed
to absorb risk).
233. See Saeedy, supra note 212 (reporting that a CLO triggered its senior OC Test, which
redirects cash flows from junior debtholders to more senior investors).
234. See Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that banks will be largely insulated from losses
stemming from their CLO holdings, which is important for the overall health of financial
markets).
235. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
343 (2020)).
236. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, FED. RES. BD. (Dec. 11, 2020)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm [https://perma.cc/NUN6-ECMW].
237. See Federal Reserve Establishes Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF),
DECHERT
LLP
(March
26,
2020)
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint/2020/3/federal-reserve-establishes-term-assetbacked-securities-loan-fa.html [https://perma.cc/L4R2-BTPP] (“During the 2008 financial
crisis, the Fed created the Legacy TALF Program to stimulate the securitization markets by
providing financing to third party investors in highly rated ABS . . . .”).
238. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New
Measures to Support the Economy (Mar. 23, 2020) (on file with author) (explaining that
TALF will enable the issuance of ABS).
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facilitated access to credit among U.S. consumers and businesses.239 The
Federal Reserve committed $100 billion to fund loans to buyers of highly
rated ABS like, for example, AAA-rated CLO debt.240 Ultimately, the
passage of TALF had important implications for the CLO market because
it provided buyers of the highest rated CLO securities access to federal
funding.241
In its initial guidance, the Federal Reserve placed several
restrictions on the kinds of borrowers that were eligible to receive TALF
funds (“Eligible Borrowers”) and on the nature of CLO debt that could
serve as collateral for a TALF loan (“Eligible CLO”).242 However, TALF
was ultimately amended multiple times in response to feedback coming
from the ABS market.243 In its final form, TALF’s impact on the CLO
market was modest at best, as an important limitation on Eligible
Collateral curtailed the utility of the program as applied to the CLO
market.244 Ultimately, two specific revisions allowed TALF to have a

239. See Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”) Funds Resources,
DECHERT
LLP
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/hot-topic/coronavirus-businessimpact/term-asset-backed-securities-loan-facility---talf---funds-resour.html
[https://perma.cc/7QT5-2JLA] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“TALF supports the flow of credit
to consumers and businesses by allowing the investment fund borrower to buy AAA-rated
ABS with significant leverage from the Fed.”).
240. See Matt Wirz, Fed Aid Could Restart the CLO Market by June, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
10, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-aid-could-restart-clo-market-by-june11586539170 [https://perma.cc/2FBW-T3UF] (“The Fed earmarked up to $100 billion . . . to
help investors buy asset-backed debt, including the highest-quality bonds of certain types of
CLOs . . . .”).
241. Id.
242. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., DECHERT LLP, CLOS AND TERM ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES LOAN FACILITY (TALF)– WE’RE NOT THAT DESPERATE (YET) 1 (2020),
https://info.dechert.com/10/14115/uploads/clos-and-term-asset-backed-securities-loanfacility-(talf)--we-re-not-that-desperate-(yet).pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KKV-R23B]
(referencing the restrictions contained in the first iteration of TALF and explaining subsequent
revisions to the program).
243. See FRBNY, Yet Again, Revises the TALF 2.0 Frequently Asked Questions, DECHERT
LLP (June 18, 2020),
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint/2020/6/frbny--yet-again--revises-the-talf-20-frequently-asked-question.html [https://perma.cc/72GG-TJDK] (noting the number of
revisions that have been made to TALF since its inception).
244. See Lee, supra note 231 (acknowledging that TALF will impact the CLO market, but
suggesting that its effect will be limited due to the requirement that Eligible CLOs must be
static).
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limited practical impact, but the overall effect of the initiative on the CLO
market was largely symbolic.245
Under TALF, Federal funds could only be employed to purchase
AAA-rated debt in static CLOs, effectively rendering the lending
program impractical for most of the CLO market.246 Static CLOs do not
permit CLO managers to actively trade the loan portfolio during the life
of the CLO and represent only a small fraction of the CLO market. 247 For
instance, static CLOs represented a mere 2% of new deals launched in
2017 and only 5% in 2019.248 This limitation, which was not scaled back
in any subsequent revision of TALF, served to meaningfully limit the
utility of the program to the CLO market. 249 Nevertheless, two
subsequent changes to TALF made the program more useful to the CLO
market, although only to a limited extent.250
All of the revisions to TALF sought to align the program more
closely with established practices within the CLO industry. 251 However,
the two most important updates to TALF were a clarification that Eligible
CLOs could contain loans issued or refinanced after January 1, 2019,252
and an update that allowed up to 65% of loans in Eligible CLOs to be

245. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (suggesting the limited utility of
TALF as applied to the CLO market); Lee, supra note 231 (explaining how TALF was revised
to allow refinanced loans to serve as Eligible Collateral); Matt Wirz, Fed TALF Revision
Could Help Clear CLO Logjam, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2020, 4:26 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-talf-revision-could-help-clear-clo-logjam-11589383995
[https://perma.cc/S3AZ-YSDH] (noting the revision to TALF which relaxed the requirement
that loans have covenants).
246. See Lee, supra note 231 (explaining how the static CLO requirement under TALF
will serve to limit the utility of the program).
247. Id.
248. Wirz, supra note 240.
249. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (“[T]he requirement[] that CLOs
be static . . . will further undercut the utility of the program in terms of facilitating the flow of
credit to U.S. businesses through CLOs.”)
250. See sources cited supra note 245.
251. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (acknowledging that certain
revisions to TALF aligned the program more closely with existing standards within the CLO
market).
252. In the initial TALF term sheet, Eligible CLOs included only CLOs whose underlying
leveraged loans were originated on or after January 1, 2019. TALF was revised to allow
Eligible CLOs to hold loans that were refinanced on or after January 1, 2019. This change
was important, as it allowed loans sitting in warehouses to serve as collateral in TALF Eligible
CLOs. See id. at 3.
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covenant-lite. 253 The update permitting Eligible CLOs to hold a
significant amount of covenant-lite loans was important given the fact
that roughly 80% of all leveraged loans are covenant-lite.254 Moreover,
the percentage of covenant-lite loans in existing CLOs portfolios is often
between 60% and 70%. 255 By aligning TALF more closely with the
realities of the CLO market, the Federal Reserve ensured that TALF
funds could be used more effectively by CLO market participants. 256
The TALF revision allowing Eligible CLOs to hold loans issued
or refinanced after January 1, 2019, had important practical implications
for the CLO market because it allowed CLO managers to finish deals that
were initiated prior to the pandemic.257 Before the downturn, many CLO
Managers relied on Warehouse Facilities from banks to purchase
portfolios of loans.258 Problematically, some of these loans were never
formally packaged into CLOs and sold to investors before market
conditions deteriorated, so when the CLO market froze $15 to $20 billion
of loans were left sitting in warehouses. 259 Under TALF these existing
loans could be pooled in new CLOs that Eligible Borrowers could invest
in.260 As revised, TALF ultimately benefited the CLO market by
facilitating the issuance of CLOs that were initiated prior to the COVID19 pandemic.261 TALF was also important for banks because the sale of
253.See id. (indicating that up to 65% of the loans in Eligible CLOs could be covenantlite); Wirz, supra note 245 (“Previous TALF guidance generally limited assistance to CLOs
that invested in new corporate loans with strong investor protections, called covenants.”).
254. See Phillips, supra note 1 (reporting that covenant-lite loans account for about 80%
of new leveraged loans).
255. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (providing a table to show
that covenant-lite loans constitute 60% to 70% of existing CLO portfolios).
256. See id. (noting that the clarification regarding new issue loans could have a modest
positive impact on the CLO market); Wirz, supra note 245 (suggesting that CLO market
participants will be able to use TALF funds more effectively in light of the revisions to
TALF).
257. See Wirz, supra note 245 (suggesting that revisions to TALF will help CLO Managers
finish deals that began prior to the COVID-19 pandemic).
258. Robert Smith & Joe Rennison, Big Banks Left Hanging after ‘Disaster’ in Risky Loan
Market, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/49ee0c64-cd97-4342-9f03fec019963fef [https://perma.cc/U6AB-3KHX].
259. Wirz, supra note 245.
260. See id. (reporting that TALF may help CLO Managers close outstanding CLO
transactions that were initiated prior to the COVID-19 pandemic).
261. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (explaining how revisions to
TALF allows loans sitting in warehouses to serve as collateral in TALF eligible CLOs).
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CLO debt obligations is what allows a CLO Manager to repay its
Warehouse Facility with the bank.262 When the CLO market stalls, banks
get stuck holding the risk of this credit extension on their balance sheet. 263
Therefore, the opportunity that TALF afforded CLO Managers—to close
CLO transactions and repay Warehouse Facilities—was also a net
positive for banks.264
While the practical effect of TALF on CLOs was relatively
limited given its narrow application to static CLOs, government
intervention nevertheless had a symbolic impact on the CLO market. 265
First, the Federal Reserve announcement regarding the launch of TALF
sparked a rally in credit markets.266 This effect was especially significant
given the nature of the CLO market, which reacts to shifts in the price of
leveraged loans267 and relies on investor confidence to drive new
issuance.268 Second, in its many revisions of TALF, the Federal Reserve
seemed to signal both the importance of the CLOs and a willingness to
meet the realistic needs of the market.269 The objective of TALF,
according to the Federal Reserve, was to facilitate the flow of credit and
“to support the longer-term, market-based financing that is critical to
economic activity.”270 In tailoring TALF to work for the CLO market in
practice, not simply in theory, the Federal Reserve implied that CLOs are
262. Wirz, supra note 245 (explaining that CLOs sell securities to investors in order to pay
off obligations incurred under their warehouse facilities).
263. Smith & Rennison, supra note 258.
264. See Wirz, supra note 245 (describing how TALF allows CLO Managers and
investment bankers to finish deals that have been “stuck in limbo” since the beginning of the
pandemic).
265. See Wirz, supra note 240 (highlighting positive sentiment coming from a CLO
Manager in response to the TALF announcement).
266. Id.
267. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (providing an example of how the CLO market
reacts to swings in the price of leveraged loans).
268. See Haunss, supra note 19 (noting that CLO issuance picked up in April and May
because investor confidence returned).
269. See Lee, supra note 244 (reporting that the Federal Reserve appeared to consider the
more detailed aspects of how the CLO market actually works when it announced revisions to
TALF).
270. The Quarterly CARES Act Report to Congress: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs Comm., 116th Cong. 4 (2020) (statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chair,
Board
of
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
System),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Testimony%205-19-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WA9Y-PKML].
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a vital mechanism through which credit critical to economic activity is
extended. 271 Moreover, when it revised TALF to allow covenant-lite
loans to comprise 65% of an Eligible CLO’s portfolio, the Federal
Reserve symbolically conformed to the industry standard 272 over and
against the crusade against covenant-lite loans in popular discourse. 273
This is important because, when presented with an opportunity to
affirmatively signal its disapproval of covenant-lite loans, the Federal
Reserve backed away from its principles274 and deferred to market
custom.275 Therefore, while the practical effect of TALF on CLOs may
have been limited at best, the program’s symbolic impact served to fortify
the CLO market in the midst of the 2020 economic downturn. 276
C.

The Structural Strength of the CLO

The primary reason why CLOs will be seen as survivors of yet
another economic downturn is hardly novel.277 Even as concerns about
ballooning corporate debt and poor credit quality mounted in the years
leading up to 2020,278 the resilience of the CLO structure was often
271. See Lee, supra note 231 (describing how a revision to TALF made the program more
useful to CLO market participants); Wirz, supra note 245 (explaining how a subsequent
change to TALF increased its utility in the context of the CLO market).
272. CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (providing a table to show that
60% to 70% of loans in a typical CLO are covenant-lite).
273. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (expressing concern over the trend towards covenantlite loans); Kristen Haunss, Regulators Sound Alarm About Leveraged Loan Market, REUTERS
(Oct. 30, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regulators-sound-the-alarmabout-leverag/regulators-sound-the-alarm-about-leveraged-loan-market-idUSL8N1XA7MH
[https://perma.cc/PFN6-5ZUC] (citing concerns about the prevalence of covenant-lite loans).
274. See Haunss, supra note 273 (highlighting concerns among present and former Federal
Reserve officials regarding the proliferation of covenant-lite loans).
275. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (highlighting the fact that an
Eligible CLO under TALF may contain covenant-lite loans in an amount equal to 65% of the
total portfolio).
276. See Lee, supra note 231 (acknowledging the positive, but limited, impact of TALF on
the CLO market).
277. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 2 (suggesting that resilient CLO structures
may mitigate losses during periods of instability).
278. See Thomas Franck, Former Fed Chair Yellen Says Excessive Corporate Debt Could
Prolong
a
Downturn,
CNBC
(Dec.
10,
2018,
10:40
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/11/janet-yellen-says-excessive-corporate-debt-couldprolong-a-downturn.html [https://perma.cc/7QCE-KGN2] (citing the concerns of former
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recognized as a factor that could serve to mitigate the systemic risk posed
by CLOs in the event of a downturn.279 In 2020, as the economy
stumbled, businesses closed, and loans defaulted, CLOs were afforded an
opportunity to finally prove that speculations as to the strength of their
structure were not speculative at all.280
CLOs survived 2020 without crippling or severely destabilizing
the financial system because CLO structures held up to provide investors
with the level of protection they were promised upon making their
original investment.281 The banks that invested in the highest-rated AAA
tranches received the protections they expected, and therefore banks did
not suffer losses capable of destabilizing the financial system.282 The
subordinated debt and equity investors—who will likely experience
losses283—also got exactly what they were promised when they invested
in the riskiest portion of the CLO structure. 284 Ultimately, CLOs were
survivors of the economic downturn because they delivered on the
promises they made to investors285 and because CLO investors were
situated in tranches best suited to accommodate their tolerance for risk. 286

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen regarding increasing amounts of low quality corporate
debt).
279. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 2 (acknowledging that resilient CLO
structures may mitigate losses in a downturn).
280. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 43, 47–48 (describing the challenges wrought by
the COVID-19 pandemic and highlighting the structural protections embedded within CLOs
that are designed to reduce risks to investors).
281. See id. at 48 (explaining that investors in both the highest-rated CLO tranches and the
more junior tranches are unlikely to experience losses despite the pandemic-induced
economic downturn).
282. See id. (predicting that the AAA-rated tranches, which banks most often hold, will not
experience losses).
283. See id. at 49 (“Market pricing of the CLO tranches today suggests that the market
expects most losses would be borne by the equity layer and some by the lower rated CLO
tranches.”); Lisa Lee, Battered CLO Investors Are About to Get a Look at Their Losses,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202004-20/clo-reckoning-arrives-downgrade-wave-tests-700-billion-market
[https://perma.cc/CN9F-NK5Q] (explaining that equity investors and subordinated
debtholders will be the first to experience losses).
284. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 5 (“Investors with . . . a higher tolerance for risk invest
in the equity (first-loss) tranche.”).
285. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (providing that investors in the highest-rated
parts of the CLO structure are not expected to experience losses); Lee, supra note 283
(indicating that investors in the riskiest parts of the CLO structure are likely to suffer losses).
286. See id. at 46 (suggesting that risks posed by the CLO market are reduced by the
diversity of investors that hold CLO securities).
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1. The CLO Structure Worked as Intended in the Face of Market
Volatility
The tranched CLO structure allows investors to purchase
securities commensurate with their individual tolerance for risk. 287
Investors who opt for lower-yielding AAA debt accept lower returns in
exchange for the protection afforded by a CLOs OC Tests.288 Conversely,
subordinated debt and equity investors knowingly trade this protection
for larger returns. 289 Thus, the OC Tests that a CLO must pass to
distribute payments to its various tranches are structural features that do
not purport to mitigate losses equally across the CLO structure. 290 When
conditions in the leveraged loan market deteriorate, a CLO’s OC Tests
serve as protective shields that prioritize payments to the AAA and AA
tranches. 291
In the midst of the 2020 downturn, CLOs tripped their OC Tests,
diverting payments away from equity investors and some subordinated
debtholders in order to repay the principal of AAA investors.292 In April
2020, it was reported that more than 10% of U.S. CLOs risked cutting
cash payments, and by May 2020, 21% of roughly 900 CLOs cut
payments to investors holding securities in the riskiest tranches of the
CLO structure.293 Moreover, for the first time since 2008, a CLO tripped
its senior OC Test.294

287. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 6 (“CLOs offer institutional investors
access to the senior secured loan market with tailored risk-adjusted return profiles. By
purchasing CLOs, banks and insurance companies can obtain exposure to the senior secured
loan market while benefitting from structural protections….”).
288. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3–4 (explaining that highly rated CLO tranches receive
lower rates of interest, but also highlighting the fact that AAA rated debt benefits from
structural protections).
289. See id. at 3, 5 (explaining that investors with a greater tolerance for risk invest in the
higher-yielding subordinated debt and equity tranches of the CLO structure).
290. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining the process by which cash flows are
diverted from junior to senior CLO tranches in the event that a CLO fails its OC Test).
291. Id. at 3.
292. Tempkin, supra note 207.
293. Id.
294. Saeedy, supra note 212.
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While reports of CLO performance during the 2020 downturn
seem to suggest that CLOs performed poorly in the midst of volatility,295
these accounts actually serve to prove that CLOs performed exactly as
intended.296 Volatile market conditions tripped CLO OC Tests, and a
protective shield was extended to safeguard the investments of senior
debtholders.297 Ultimately, the AAA investors who opted for smaller
returns in exchange for more robust protection got what they paid for,298
as payments were diverted to guarantee the safety of their investments.299
Conversely, the junior debtholders and equity investors who assumed
more risk hoping to win the lottery will likely be reminded of the inherent
risk in their investment300 after years of impressive returns.301
2. CLO Investors Hold CLO Securities Well-Tailored to Their Appetite
for Risk
While CLOs survived 2020 due to their structural strength, the
protections embedded within the CLO structure were especially
meaningful when considered in the context of who they protected. 302 The
type of investor that occupied each tranche of the CLO structure was

295. See Sally Bakewell & Lisa Lee, CLO Engineering Is No Match for COVID-19 As
Payments
Get
Cut
Off,
BLOOMBERG (Apr.
30,
2020,
10:59
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/clo-engineering-is-no-match-forcovid-19-as-payments-get-cut-off [https://perma.cc/P5RM-9QWF] (“Loans are getting
downgraded and their value is dropping, which is triggering protections designed to protect
the safest securities issued by CLOs, those rated AAA.”).
296. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (reporting that AAA-rated CLO tranches are
not expected to experience losses).
297. See Bakewell & Lee, supra note 295 (“Loans are getting downgraded and their value
is dropping, which is triggering protections designed to protect the safest securities issued by
CLOs, those rated AAA.”)
298. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that holders of senior CLO debt receive
less interest but are afforded greater security in the CLO structure).
299. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (reporting that AAA-rated CLO tranches are
not expected to experience losses).
300. See Lee, supra note 283 (predicting that investors in the high-risk, high-yield portion
of the CLO structure will experience losses due to the 2020 downturn).
301.
Why
CLO
Equity,
EAGLE
POINT
CREDIT
CO.,
http://www.eaglepointcreditcompany.com/why-clos [https://perma.cc/C5JV-LXB9] (last
visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“[Ninety-six percent] of U.S. CLOs issued between 2002 and 2011 had
a positive return on the equity tranche, with only 4% returning less than the original invested
capital.”).
302. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 49 (explaining that losses confined to the equity
tranche have a limited macroeconomic impact).
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ultimately an important factor that allowed CLOs to weather the 2020
downturn without prompting systemic financial instability.303
The stability of the financial system largely depends on the
vitality of banks, so in moments of economic peril, it is important that
banks have the capacity to withstand losses and continue lending.304 By
cabining 95.4% of their holdings in the senior-most tranches of the CLO
structure305 banks sacrifice high returns for structural protections that
allow them to avert major losses.306 In 2020, when economic volatility
forced CLOs to cut payments to investors, CLOs made good on their
promise to protect bank investments, as there were no defaults on AAArated debt.307 Moreover, according to an analysis from Moody’s, CLO
OC Tests will continue to protect bank investments even in the event of
a protracted economic downturn, as it would take a cumulative loan
default rate in excess of 80% to impair AAA securities.308 Fitch Ratings’
year-end default forecast suggests a cumulative leveraged loan default
rate of 5% to 6% in 2020 and 8% to 9% in 2021.309
While it was important for the stability of the financial system in
2020 that banks invested in the senior tranches of the CLO structure, it
was equally as important that asset managers, hedge funds, and other
privately managed funds held the riskiest CLO securities.310 This is
because a CLO’s protective shields are only effective in thwarting
instability if losses are confined to investors capable of shouldering the

303. See id. at 43, 49 (predicting that losses will be confined to equity tranches, which are
often held by asset managers, pension funds, and other private funds).
304. See Lang, supra note 21 (highlighting the importance of stable banks to the safety of
the financial system and suggesting that bank losses contribute to systemic instability).
305. WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89.
306. Cf. KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 6 (providing that banks benefit from
structural protections due to the nature of their investment in CLOs).
307. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (“[T]he AAA-rated senior tranches will not
incur losses unless economic conditions worsen dramatically.”).
308. See Brian Chappatta, Opinion, First ETF for CLOs is Ultra-Safe. No, Seriously.,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/202009-10/first-etf-for-clos-is-ultra-safe-no-seriously [https://perma.cc/PSY7-Q9LG] (“[T]he
cumulative collateral default rate would have to reach 70% to 80% before double-A CLOs
would be impaired . . . . The triple A tranche is even further out of reach.”).
309. Credit: 2020 Hindsight, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (July 30, 2020),
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/credit-2020-hindsight/
[https://perma.cc/WT7MUD6U].
310. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 43, 49 (indicating that losses will be confined to
CLO equity tranches held by asset managers and private funds).

498

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

burden.311 Importantly, the investors that hold the high-yielding, riskiest
pieces of the CLO structure are those with the highest tolerance for big
swings in performance.312 Market volatility and losses negatively affect
subordinated debt and equity holders, but only to a limited extent because
the market “is not held by weak hands.”313 In 2018, for instance, equity
investors ended the year with losses of 11.4%, and no large-scale
financial instability ensued.314 The story of 2020 will be largely similar,
as losses will likely be confined to the equity investors that are better
positioned to withstand losses.315
V. THE FUTURE OF THE CLO MARKET
CLOs have evolved in the years since their inception, and CLOs
today are notably different than those that first entered the market in the
late 1980s.316 In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the structure of
post-crisis CLOs changed in order to make senior tranches safer and more
attractive. 317 The passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010 also incited change, as
CLOs refashioned themselves into vehicles that banks could invest in
without violating the Volcker Rule.318 Considering this history of
evolution, it is fair to ask whether CLOs might change in response to the

311. See id. at 49 (explaining that losses borne by the equity layer present little
macroeconomic risk); Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that bank losses could lead to
widespread disruption in financial markets).
312. See Rennison, supra note 12 (reporting that the riskiest parts of the CLO structure are
held by those with a high tolerance for market volatility).
313. See id. (quoting a CLO equity investor, “[w]hen the market falls and you have to mark
down your portfolio 10 per cent that hurts but it doesn’t create forced sellers. This market is
not held by weak hands.”).
314. See id. (suggesting that equity investors are able to withstand large losses without
disrupting financial markets).
315. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 49 (predicting losses will be realized exclusively
among equity investors); see also CLOs: Not So Opaque, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING
ASS’N (June 20, 2019), https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clos-not-so-opaque/
[https://perma.cc/8U4M-3RRP] (explaining that asset managers are well positioned to assume
greater risk).
316. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 100 (describing the evolution of the CLO
structure in response to market changes).
317. Id. at 100–01.
318. Id. at 101.
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economic downturn of 2020.319 So, how will CLOs evolve in light of the
economic slowdown? In short, CLOs may change modestly, but not
monumentally in the aftermath of 2020.320 It is possible that in a post2020 landscape characterized by increased corporate defaults, CLOs may
be permitted to hold larger amounts of distressed loans or equity received
as part of a restructuring. 321 However, apart from these potential
developments, the CLO market after 2020 is unlikely to look much
different from the market that preceded it.322
A.

Post-2020 CLOs May Hold More Distressed Assets and Equity

CLOs are limited in the kinds of assets they are permitted to
While a large majority of loans in any given CLO portfolio are
hold.
rated B, CLO Managers are typically allowed to hold a limited number
of loans with a CCC rating—usually in an amount constituting 7.5% of
the portfolio.324 Other restrictions include an inability to purchase loans
trading below 60 to 65 cents on the dollar325 and a prohibition against
injecting new capital into a distressed borrower whose loan is part of the
CLO’s underlying collateral.326 Finally, while CLOs are generally
permitted to hold equity received in connection with a restructuring,
323

319. See id. at 100 (describing the evolution of the CLO structure in response to market
changes).
320. See Haunss, supra note 22 (suggesting a way in which the CLO market may evolve
in response to the 2020 economic downturn); Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (describing
potential changes in the CLO market that could arise in response to the 2020 downturn).
321. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (noting that some CLO Managers are amending
the terms of their CLOs to allow the CLO greater flexibility to participate in restructurings).
322. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (reporting that investor demand for
leveraged loans is strong and that deal documents appear to be no more lender-friendly than
they were prior to the pandemic).
323. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4 (“CLOs are structured with specific investment
limitations . . . which aim to protect investors from potential losses.”)
324. Id. at 4.
325. Haunss, supra note 22.
326. Lisa Lee & Sally Bakewell, Hedge Funds Exploit CLO Weakness Laid Bare by
Corporate
Distress,
BLOOMBERG
(June
22,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-22/hedge-funds-exploit-clo-weaknesslaid-bare-by-corporate-distress [https://perma.cc/PVY7-T22M].
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holding large amounts of equity might negatively impact a CLO’s ability
to meet its various performance tests.327
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic
downturn, leveraged loan prices fell,328 ratings agencies downgraded
many B-rated loans to CCC329 and corporate bankruptcies surged.330 In
this new economic landscape, the constraints designed to protect CLO
investors may ultimately prove too rigid.331 For instance, limitations on
equity holdings and a prohibition on providing new money to a borrower
in bankruptcy may frustrate a CLO Manager’s effort to recoup value on
a distressed loan in its portfolio.332 In some cases, hedge funds have taken
advantage of CLO limitations and have opportunistically cut CLOs out
of deals during the restructuring process.333 Moreover, based on current
limitations in CLO governing documents, CLO Managers that see longterm value in loans trading below 60 cents on the dollar are precluded
from purchasing these assets, potentially causing CLO investors to lose
out on significant returns when the loans recover and repay investors at
par.334
327. See id. (“While they're allowed to receive equity in exchange for struggling loans in
restructurings, it can be unappealing because of the impact on crucial compliance tests used
to determine CLO investor payouts.”).
328. See Joe Rennison, US Leveraged Loan Prices Slump to Lowest Since Financial Crisis,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7e81b818-683a-11ea-800dda70cff6e4d3 [https://perma.cc/MTY8-NSVZ] (reporting that the average leveraged loan
price sunk to 84 cents on the dollar, its lowest level since August 2009).
329. See Amid Record Leveraged Loan Downgrades, B– Debt Swells, CCC Loans Test
CLO
Limits,
S&P
GLOBAL
MKT.
INTEL.
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/amidrecord-leveraged-loan-downgrades-b-8211-debt-swells-ccc-loans-test-clo-limits-57959048
[https://perma.cc/GER9-LB7F] (highlighting that the share of the S&P/LSTA Index rated
CCC or lower rose to 7.48% in March, which represented a 1.67% increase since February).
330. See Patrick Mathurin et al., Pandemic Triggers Wave of Billion -Dollar US
Bankruptcies, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/277dc354-a870-41609117-b5b0dece5360 [https://perma.cc/RJ9Y-YTY4] (reporting that 157 companies with
liabilities of more than $50 million have filed for bankruptcy as of August 2020).
331. See Lee & Bakewell, supra note 326 (explaining how CLO limitations are making it
difficult for CLOs to take advantage of opportunities emerging in the market).
332. See id. (explaining how limitations on holding equity and injecting capital are forcing
some CLOs to sell distressed assets to a depressed market, which often leads to lower
recoveries).
333. See id. (providing specific examples of how CLOs are being deliberately cut out of
bankruptcy deals that convert the debt of a distressed borrower to equity).
334. Haunss, supra note 22 (describing the restrictions that prevent CLO Managers from
purchasing loans priced below a certain threshold and explaining why some CLO Managers
are pushing back against such limitations).
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Two solutions have emerged to provide CLO Managers with
more flexibility to respond to market changes prompted by the COVID19 pandemic.335 First, certain CLO Managers have amended their
governing documents to permit CLOs to hold more distressed assets, and
some are considering new ways that CLOs might be able to provide new
capital in corporate restructurings.336 The second proposal suggests that
loan prices be tied to an index—rather than a set price—that can account
for market volatility.337 In this scenario, CLO Managers would have the
ability to purchase loans that trade below 60 cents on the dollar.338
While it is enticing to believe that greater flexibility for CLO
Managers is a categorically positive development, opponents suggest that
these changes could allow CLO Managers to make risky investments that
jeopardize the returns of investors.339 For investors in the senior AAArated tranche, low and stable returns are preferable to the unpredictability
of risky distressed debt plays.340 In a typical CLO, senior debtholders
constitute 60% of the structure,341 so there is good reason to doubt that
the majority of CLOs will eagerly adopt changes that allow CLO
Managers greater flexibility.342 Nevertheless, it is likely that some CLOs
will adapt to the post-pandemic economic landscape by granting CLO
Managers greater discretion to maximize returns on distressed assets.343

335. See id. (reporting on a proposal to tie leveraged loan prices to an index); Lee &
Husband, supra note 2 (explaining how CLO Managers are responding to the limitations in
their governing documents which have hindered CLO Managers in their attempt to recoup
distressed investments).
336. Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (explaining how CLO Managers are responding to the
limitations in their governing documents which have hindered CLO Managers in their attempt
to recoup the value of distressed investments).
337. See Haunss, supra note 22 (“CLO managers are now looking to tie the price at which
a loan can be purchased to an index to account for market volatility rather than a set price.”).
338. See id. (explaining how the proposal to tie loan prices to an index would allow CLO
Managers to take advantage of volatility in the leveraged loan market).
339. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (describing how debt investors might push back
against giving more flexibility to CLO Managers to purchase distressed assets).
340. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 5 (suggesting that investors in the senior portion of
the CLO structure have a lower risk tolerance than those in the bottom tranches).
341. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.
342. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (highlighting the potential for push back from
senior debtholders in the CLO structure).
343. See id. (providing examples of CLO Managers that have already begun to amend their
governing documents to give managers more flexibility).
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The CLO Market Will Remain Largely Unchanged After 2020

After the 2008 financial crisis, the CLO market experienced a
slowdown that gradually ebbed as the economy recovered. 344 The same
scenario is likely post-2020 as the CLO market licks its wounds from the
economic downturn wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic.345 However,
unlike the aftermath of 2008—which saw the evolution of the CLO
structure346—CLOs and the CLO market post-2020 will likely remain
unchanged. 347 Specifically, demand for CLOs will continue to yield
Credit Agreements with few lender protections 348 and the prevalence of
covenant-lite loans in the market will remain the industry standard. 349
The Federal Reserve’s decision to keep interest rates low for the
foreseeable future350 suggests that the forces which drove investors to the
CLO market prior to the downturn will be just as strong after 2020. 351 In

344. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that the CLO market experienced
low levels of new issuance and an investor sell-off following the financial crisis but
highlighting the recovery of the market).
345. See Haunss, supra note 19 (describing the decrease in CLO issuance during the earliest
months of the pandemic and suggesting that new issuance is beginning to rebound).
346. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 100 (detailing the evolution of the CLO
structure).
347. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (highlighting the fact that longstanding
complaints about the poor credit quality of leveraged loans remain prevalent despite the
volatility caused by the 2020 downturn).
348. See id. (reporting that despite modest improvement in the earliest months of the
pandemic, recent Credit Agreements suggest a return to pre-pandemic borrower-friendly
terms).
349. See Brian Chappatta, Opinion, The ‘Cov-Lite’ Fight in Leveraged Loans is Lost,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/202002-18/the-cov-lite-fight-in-leveraged-loans-islost?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=dsa&utm_term=&gclid=Cj0
KCQiAoab_BRCxARIsANMx4S7nOdamwLT45S2zFtgGgVelFsNoxoZd8SStyg9PacU6cy
hVTGtIgZkaAtNMEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/R5QQ-6SSC] (suggesting that covenantlite loans are the new industry standard).
350. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 2020) (on file with author) (“The
Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and
expects it will be appropriate to maintain this target range . . . .”); see also James Politi &
Colby Smith, Fed Signals Rock-Bottom Rates Until at Least End of 2023, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
16,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/827302da-4257-4bbc-a0fa-9bc98f65d661
[https://perma.cc/HV5B-PPYT] (reporting that the Federal Reserve projected no interest rate
increases until 2023).
351. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining how the “hunt for better yields”
led many investors to the CLO market).
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low interest rate environments, CLOs provide investors with attractive
returns relative to similarly rated assets.352 Therefore, investor demand
for CLOs is likely to remain robust as the economy recovers from the
2020 downturn.353 Strong investor demand for CLOs in the lead up to
2020 did, however, lend to the deterioration of lender protections in
Credit Agreements.354 This trend will continue well past 2020 as demand
prompts investors to compete for leveraged loans.355 Because widespread
downgrades and borrower defaults in 2020 did little to scale back
borrower-friendly terms in Credit Agreements, investors should not
expect a shift towards greater lender protections in the future. 356
Even before the 2020 downturn, some suggested that the ship had
sailed on covenant-lite loans and that the fight to bring fully covenanted
loans357 back to the market was lost.358 To the extent the ship may have
been lingering in the port, 2020 was the wind that finally set the vessel
free. 359 In revising TALF to allow Eligible CLOs to hold covenant-lite
loans in an amount equal to 65% of the portfolio, the Federal Reserve
implied its acceptance of the industry standard. 360 A TALF program that
352. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that CLOs have attractive risk-return
profiles, especially as compared to similarly rated securities in the market).
353. See supra note 350 and accompanying text; see also Oldfield & Anthony, supra note
10 (describing how the search for higher yields in low interest rate environments leads
investors to the CLO market).
354. Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (“[S]trong investor demand has allowed CLO
managers to loosen controls over investment quality such as to allow increases in permitted
exposures to riskier loans.”).
355. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (“[W]ith supply actually running below
demand, investor appetite for acceptable deals is solid.”)
356. See id. (suggesting that terms in Credit Agreements have returned to normal after
moving slightly towards increased lender protections in the earliest months of the COVID-19
pandemic).
357. Loans with traditional covenants, as opposed to covenant-lite loans, have protective
mechanisms built into the Credit Agreement for the safety and benefit of lenders. For
instance, a borrower might be required to remain in compliance with a financial maintenance
covenant that measures the debt service capabilities of the borrower. James Chen, CovenantLite Loan Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/covenant-liteloans.asp [https://perma.cc/XW26-G7LV] (last updated Dec. 1, 2020).
358. See Chappatta, supra note 349 (arguing, even before the onset of the pandemic, that
covenant-lite loans are the new industry standard).
359. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 12 (providing that 85% of loans that underly CLO
portfolios are covenant-lite).
360. See Wirz, supra note 245 (reporting that TALF was revised to allow Eligible CLOs
to hold more covenant-lite loans).
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restricted the ability of Eligible CLOs to hold covenant-lite loans would
have reflected the concerns of regulators,361 but it would have proven
unworkable in a market where the vast majority of loans are covenantlite.362 Ultimately, the Federal Reserve prioritized the goal of making
TALF useful to the CLO market, indicating a tacit acceptance of
covenant-lite loans as a significant part of the CLO market.363
VI. CONCLUSION
CLOs were survivors of the 2008 financial crisis. 364 However,
the praise CLOs received for successfully weathering the turmoil of 2008
was short-lived.365 From a post-crisis trough of $263 billion,366 the CLO
market surged to become the more than $600 billion market it is today,367
and with this meteoric growth came spirited criticism.368 In recent years,
CLO demand has purportedly caused corporate debt to reach
unsustainable levels and has brought about a decline in underwriting
standards.369 Prior to 2020, critics warned that in the event of a downturn,
the outstanding $1.3 trillion of poor-quality corporate loans could prove
ruinous to the CLOs that held them.370 In 2020, the economic downturn
361. See Joy Wiltermuth & Kristen Haunss, Yellen Warns of Corporate Distress, Economic
Fallout, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:55 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yellendistressed/yellen-warns-of-corporate-distress-economic-fallout-idUSKCN1QG2CZ
[https://perma.cc/VJJ4-X36L] (discussing former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen’s
concerns regarding the proliferation of covenant-lite loans).
362. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
363. See Wirz, supra note 245 (reporting that TALF was revised to allow Eligible CLOs
to hold more covenant-lite loans).
364. JOHNSON, supra note 30 at 1.
365. Cf. Brown & Salander, supra note 3 (“For the past several years, market observers
have warned of risks associated with collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs.”).
366. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37.
367. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8.
368. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1 (“[T]op Federal Reserve policymakers cited the
surging growth of this market as a reason to ‘remain mindful of vulnerabilities’ and possible
risks to the financial system.”).
369. See supra Part III.
370. See Sally Bakewell, CLO Machine is Approaching Full-Tilt, and Credit Quality
Suffers,
BLOOMBERG
(May
25,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-25/clo-machine-is-approaching-full-tiltand-credit-quality-suffers [https://perma.cc/7VWW-HNJL] (“[A] lot of CLOs have been
stuffed with weaker credits. A downturn, if and when that happens, will uncover these
weaknesses.”).
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caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was the kind of destabilizing event
that critics of CLOs feared, yet CLOs escaped this financial instability
relatively unscathed. 371
In spite of the many criticisms they faced prior to the 2020
downturn, CLOs did not suffer the kinds of losses capable of sending
shock waves through the economy. 372 Ultimately, government support in
the form of TALF and the structural strength of the CLO emerged as the
primary reasons why CLOs were capable of weathering the volatility of
2020.373 When the dust from the 2020 downturn finally settles, the CLO
market may look modestly different as CLO Managers lobby for more
flexibility to invest strategically in the post-pandemic market.374
However, monumental change is not likely to grip the CLO market, as
demand for CLOs will continue to encourage corporate borrowing and
will produce the same borrower-friendly Credit Agreements that were
predominant prior to the downturn.375
EMILY K. COOKE 

371. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 41, 48 (explaining that the CLO market weathered
the 2020 downturn and suggesting that the market is “headed for recovery”).
372. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part IV.B; supra Part IV.C.
374. See supra Part V.
375. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (suggesting that demand among investors
remains strong and that, as of July 2020, Credit Agreements are continuing to incorporate the
borrower-friendly terms that were common prior to the downturn).
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